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A Gun to Whose Head? Federalism,
Localism, and the Spending Clause
Daniel S. Cohen*
ABSTRACT
President Trump’s executive order rescinding federal funds
from “sanctuary jurisdictions” has brought a critical, but over-
looked, question of constitutional law to the forefront of the po-
litical debate:  how does the Spending Clause apply to local
governments?  The purpose of the Spending Clause is to em-
power the federal government to bargain with the states to enact
policies it cannot enact itself.  This power, however, is con-
strained within the confines of federalism.  The Supreme Court
has sought to restrict the Spending Clause by crafting the Dole-
NFIB framework, a test to determine whether a federal grant has
compromised federalism.  At its core, the framework seeks to
preserve states’ agency in deciding whether to exchange policy
for federal dollars.  This core concern and the specific factors that
comprise the Dole-NFIB framework are also implicated when
the federal government bargains with local governments.  Local
governments in the United States have evolved from agents of
their states to the third-tier of federalism.  Accordingly, courts
must apply the Spending Clause in a manner that protects local
agency just as it protects state agency.  This Article proposes two
models by which the courts can effectively apply the Spending
Clause to protect local governments:  the Decision-Maker Model
and the Localized Expenditure Model.
The Decision-Maker Model views localities as representa-
tive political entities that exercise agency in the same manner as
states.  Thus, this model applies the Dole-NFIB framework to a
locality when the locality in question has the authority to accept
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the federal government’s financial inducement.  The Localized
Expenditure Model accepts the traditional, bilateral conception
of federalism, but also applies the Dole-NFIB framework to lo-
calities because it recognizes the targeted pressure the federal
government places on states when it withholds funds from spe-
cific localities.
While these models assert different justifications for the role
that general-jurisdiction local governments play in the Court’s
Spending Clause doctrine, they achieve the same result where lo-
cal governments are offered and may accept federal funds:  the
locality is the subject of the Spending Clause analysis.  Applying
one of these two models and, more broadly, applying the Spend-
ing Clause to localities is essential because, as demonstrated by
the sanctuary cities controversy, political polarization is increas-
ing along a geographical dimension.  Policy divides between fed-
eral officials and city leaders will be sharp for the foreseeable
future, and federal funds will remain an attractive policy lever.
Thus, the use of the spending power must be appropriately con-
strained to preserve American federalism as it exists.
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INTRODUCTION
Just five days after his inauguration, President Donald Trump
began to fulfill his promise to block funding for “sanctuary cities”1
by signing Executive Order 13768 (“EO 13768”).2  According to the
order, once the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
determines which jurisdictions are “sanctuary jurisdictions,” the At-
torney General may prevent those jurisdictions from receiving any
federal funding.3  The President’s threat to rescind federal funding
from sanctuary jurisdictions pits the federal government against the
leadership of several of the largest states, such as California and
New York, and the mayors of some of the nation’s biggest cities—
including Chicago, San Francisco, New York City, and Washington,
D.C.4  The order has also engendered conflict between various local
governments and their state governments.  Texas, in particular, has
become an intense battleground.  Some of the state’s largest cit-
ies—Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio—challenged a state law,
enacted on the heels of EO 13768, that penalizes various law-en-
forcement policies associated with sanctuary cities.5  The political
1. See Douglas Hanks, Miami-Dade Mayor Resists ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Label as
Trump Promises Crackdown, MIAMI-HERALD (Nov. 15, 2016), https://hrld.us/
2Lo4A8A [https://perma.cc/P2WP-462K].
2. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg.
8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter EO 13768].
3. Id. at 8801.
4. See Ruairı´ Arrieta-Kenna, Sanctuary Cities Stand Firm Against Trump, PO-
LITICO (Dec. 12, 2016), https://politi.co/2S9Pg27 [https://perma.cc/9Y4V-LE4Z].
5. Houston to Join Lawsuit Against Texas ‘Sanctuary City’ Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (June 21, 2017) [hereinafter Houston Joins Sanctuary City Lawsuit],
https://bit.ly/2Dmiy9I [https://perma.cc/4DSP-9R6G].  Judge Orlando Garcia of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against the law on August 30, 2017. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas,
264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017).  The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the
Texas constitution does not prohibit the state from preempting cities’ Home-Rule
authority and that the law does not, on its face, violate the Fourth Amendment by
requiring local law enforcement who have custody of a person subject to an immi-
gration detainer request to comply with that request.  City of El Cenizo v. Texas,
890 F.3d 164, 190–91 (5th Cir. 2018).  Consequently, and with respect to the afore-
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fights in cities and states across the country have made the intersec-
tion of federalism, localism, and the Spending Clause one of the
most prominent constitutional issues of President Trump’s term.
EO 13768 comes at an interesting and important time in the
development of the Supreme Court’s Spending Clause doctrine.
Prior to 2012, legal scholars argued that the Court’s Spending
Clause doctrine was toothless, having never been used to strike
down a single federal law.6  In 2012, the Court made history in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB)7 by
using the Spending Clause to invalidate the Medicaid expansion
provision of the Affordable Care Act.8 NFIB suggests that the
Spending Clause places meaningful restrictions on Congress’s
spending power or at least demonstrates that the Roberts Court is
more willing than its predecessors to find Spending Clause viola-
tions.  Through its binding “Joint Opinion,” the Court reaffirmed its
Spending Clause jurisprudence—to protect the structure of federal-
ism by ensuring that state governments can bargain with the federal
government at will—and its legal principles—clear conditions, non-
coercion, public welfare, germaneness, constitutional conditions,
and contract law.  The Court also affirmed the importance of politi-
cal accountability in the Spending Clause analysis.  At its heart, the
Court’s fractured opinion solidified the Spending Clause’s role in
safeguarding federalism by preserving states’ autonomy when they
bargain with the federal government.
The Court has yet to apply its new(er) Spending Clause juris-
prudence in a case where the federal government offered federal
funds directly to localities; and it is not clear how the Court would
rule in such a case.9  Numerous localities have either changed their
mentioned issues, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunc-
tion and remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 192.
6. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the
Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress
Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003) (arguing that the test estab-
lished in Dole is “toothless,” as evidenced by the fact that courts have hardly ap-
plied three of the five elements and have never struck down federal legislation on
this basis, and conceptually infirm); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Lever-
aging Principle and Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013) (ex-
plaining that National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was the first
time the Court struck down an act of Congress on the basis of the Spending
Clause).
7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and the
New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 158 (2016) (“How
does the coercion ban apply to local governments? . . . Does that right tolerate
federal efforts to restructure intra-state authority?”).
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law-enforcement policies to comply with EO 1376810 or initiated
lawsuits to invalidate the order, asserting violations of the Spending
Clause, the anti-commandeering doctrine, and the Tenth Amend-
ment.11  It is imperative for the Court to determine how its Spend-
ing Clause jurisprudence applies to localities.
The localist nature of American federalism complicates the
Court’s current Spending Clause jurisprudence.  Traditionally, the
United States has understood federalism as a two-tiered structure,
with a federal tier and a state tier.12  Each tier has its own powers
and responsibilities; each has its own constituencies; each is su-
preme over the other in specific policy spheres.  Specifically, states
are supreme over the federal government when addressing issues
that are the provenance of state government.13  Thus, when such
issues arise, state governments are the only constitutionally relevant
political institutions within a state’s territory.  On paper, this view
seems unimpeachable, rooted in the durable precedent of Hunter v.
Pittsburgh.14  A closer look at how American federalism actually
functions and how courts have applied Hunter, however, reveals
that the United States actually operates as a three-tiered political
system in most areas.
The Supreme Court decided Hunter at the end of the “Dillon’s
Rule” era, a time when local governments were instruments of the
state government.15  Under Dillon’s Rule, localities had no powers
except those specifically granted to them by the state.16  Beginning
in the Progressive Era, and accelerating after World War II, states
10. See Alan Gomez, Miami-Dade Commission Votes to End County’s ‘Sanc-
tuary’ Status, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017), https://bit.ly/2LtKNEU [https://
perma.cc/D2GS-4XEP]; see also Cory Frolik, Dayton Police Revise Immigration
Status Policy, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Feb. 9, 2017), https://bit.ly/2R3PbzD [https://
perma.cc/7X2P-CE7A].
11. See Maura Dolan, San Francisco Sues Trump over Executive Order
Targeting Sanctuary Cities, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://lat.ms/2LqashN
[https://perma.cc/ER2D-SFJU]; Daniel Beekman, Seattle Sues Trump Administra-
tion over ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Order, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://bit.ly/
2R2BKA0 [https://perma.cc/6WQW-E46R]; see also Maureen Dolan & James
Queally, Santa Clara County Seeks to Block Trump’s Order to Defund Sanctuary
Cities, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://lat.ms/2Gq2bez [https://perma.cc/8UVA-
8K6D].
12. See generally KENNETH R. THOMAS, FEDERALISM, STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
AND THE CONSTITUTION: BASIS AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (Sept. 23,
2013), https://bit.ly/2SRFmSu [https://perma.cc/BF6F-LMP7].
13. Id.
14. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
15. Dillon’s Rule was widely applied by state governments to their localities
in the late 18th century. See RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER 61–63 (2016).
16. States began implementing Home Rule in the early 20th century. See in-
fra Part II.B.1.
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granted their localities “Home Rule.”17  Under the Home-Rule sys-
tem, local government began to take its current shape:  locally
elected officials exercising meaningful formal powers over a range
of fundamental areas, such as land use, emergency services, sanita-
tion, housing, and transportation.  Importantly, Home Rule re-
versed the Dillon’s Rule structure by granting broad powers to local
government rather than limiting them to specific delegations of au-
thority only.  For over seven decades, local governments have exer-
cised these broad powers.
Since at least the end of World War II, state and federal gov-
ernments have recognized local authority in a manner that strongly
indicates that localism is a feature of the American political system.
States rarely alter the territorial limits of local jurisdictions, unlike
congressional districts, which are constantly redrawn.18  Leaving lo-
cal boundaries untouched illustrates the respect the states have for
localities as polities.  The federal government also often treats local
governments as a distinct tier of the federalist system.  Consider
three examples.  First, the Supreme Court has held that the princi-
ple of “one man, one vote” applies to localities.19  Second, sover-
eign immunity does not automatically apply to localities, even
though it automatically applies to state agencies.20  Third, in many
instances where Congress has enacted a law to preempt state au-
thority, it has also explicitly stated that the law preempts local au-
thority.21  It would be odd for the federal government to take such
positions if local governments are no different from statewide
agencies.
In stark contrast to the traditional conception of American fed-
eralism, the United States’ federalist system, which this Article
terms “localist federalism,” endows local governments with signifi-
cant formal legal authority.22  The broad scope of this legal author-
ity and the protection localities receive from state governments
make them, for the purposes of the Spending Clause, “mini-sover-
eigns,” rather than administrative units of their states.  Accordingly,
the federal government’s attempts to induce localities to enact spe-
cific policies through fiscal rewards or punishments implicate the
federalism concerns that the Court’s restrictions on the Spending
Clause are designed to protect.
17. See infra Part II.B.1.
18. See infra Part II.B.3.
19. See infra Part II.B.3.
20. See infra Part II.B.3.
21. See infra Part II.B.3.
22. See infra Part II.B.3.
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This Article proposes two methods by which courts can faith-
fully apply the Spending Clause to cases of federal-local bargaining:
the Decision-Maker Model and the Localized Expenditure Model.
The Decision-Maker Model argues that the Spending Clause ap-
plies to the entity that has the authority to accept or decline an
offer of federal funds.  Accordingly, when the federal government
offers funds to a general-jurisdiction local government that has the
authority to accept or decline the funds, that entity—not its state
government—is the subject of the Court’s limitations on the Spend-
ing Clause.  Therefore, this model argues that the Court’s Spending
Clause analysis should be applied to the local government directly,
just as the Court has previously applied this analysis to state gov-
ernments.  The Decision-Maker Model ensures that the Spending
Clause does not trample the federalism concerns upon which it is
founded.23
The Localized Expenditure Model is based on the conven-
tional understanding of federalism.  However, it proposes the same
analysis as the Decision-Maker Model for two reasons.  First, this
model recognizes the authority of the states to govern their terri-
tory through representative local governments.  Second, it identifies
the coercive threat states face when the federal government re-
scinds federal funding from specific localities:  the decision to re-
capitalize specific localities for lost funding.  While both models
assert different justifications for the role of general-jurisdiction lo-
cal governments in the Court’s Spending Clause doctrine, they
achieve the same result when the federal government offers federal
funds to local governments:  subjecting the locality to the Court’s
Spending Clause analysis.
These models are presented as alternatives to what this Article
terms the “Hunter Model.”  Under the Hunter Model, the Court’s
Spending Clause analysis is applied to the state government, even
when the bargaining occurs solely between local officials and the
federal government.  This model applies a strong interpretation of
Hunter, accepting the idea that localities are mere agents of the
state.
The Court’s method of determining which entity is subject to
the federal government’s inducement or coercion is of considerable
importance.  The result of the Court’s decision will (1) determine
whether President Trump’s actions, and similar future actions, are
constitutional; (2) shape the balance of power between the federal
government and localities moving forward; and (3) shape the func-
23. See infra Part III.A.
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tioning of America’s form of localist federalism.  Because the
United States is politically polarized along an urban/non-urban axis,
it is imperative that the Supreme Court answer this question defini-
tively.  This trend of political polarization, which seems durable,
will lead to increased conflict between federal and local entities.
Republican politicians will seek to induce or threaten Democratic
cities to comply with their preferred policy positions, and Demo-
cratic politicians will do the same to Republican suburbs and rural
communities.  It is critical for the courts to recognize the role locali-
ties play in American government or, at least, to apply the Spend-
ing Clause in a consistent manner for both federal-state and
federal-local bargaining and thus preserve the crucial elements of
federalism.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Sanctuary Cities
On January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump signed EO
13768—“Enhancing the Public Safety of the Interior of the United
States.”24  The purpose of the order is to “[e]nsure that jurisdictions
that fail to comply with applicable Federal [immigration] law,” 8
U.S.C. § 137325 in particular, “do not receive Federal funds, except
as mandated by law.”26  These jurisdictions, usually local govern-
ments, are more popularly known as sanctuary cities.  The label re-
fers to these cities’ refusals to assist federal immigration officials.27
For example, these localities often refuse to comply with Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement agents’ detainer requests for un-
documented immigrants held in the custody of local law
enforcement.28
Sanctuary cities first gained prominence in 2008 when several
localities refused to comply with President George W. Bush’s SE-
CURE Communities program; this program “required local author-
ities to share the fingerprints of all arrestees—legal and illegal,
citizens and foreigners—for a run through a federal database to
make sure they were in the country legally.”29  More localities be-
24. EO 13768, supra note 2. R
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018).
26. EO 13768, supra note 2, at 9. R
27. Darla Cameron, How Sanctuary Cities Work, and How Trump’s Blocked
Executive Order Could Have Affected Them, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://
wapo.st/2CllNfT [https://perma.cc/J5MB-HJSX].
28. Id.
29. Shikha Dalmia, Undocumented Aliens May Be Safe in Sanctuary Cities,
Thanks to Conservative Justices, REASON (Feb. 2, 2017), https://bit.ly/2EBGC9m
[https://perma.cc/M46Y-7HW7].
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came sanctuary cities during President Barack Obama’s first term
as he expanded the Bush era program.30  By early 2017, over 500
cities and counties self-identified as or were labeled sanctuary cit-
ies.31  These localities include major metropolitan areas such as
New York, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Chicago as well as
small towns like Ashland, Oregon and Aberdeen, Washington.32
Since 2011, Republican representatives have introduced at
least four different bills to strip sanctuary cities of immigration and
law-enforcement-related federal funds.  The House of Representa-
tives passed three of these bills.  In 2011, Republicans introduced
the “Mobilizing Against Sanctuary Cities Act.”33  The bill provided
that “[a]ny State or local government that violates section 642 of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (8 U.S.C. § 1373) may not receive any Federal financial as-
sistance.”34  The bill also empowered the Attorney General to de-
termine which jurisdictions violated section 642.35  The bill was re-
introduced in 2013, but it did not receive a vote on either
occasion.36
Republicans introduced the “Enforce the Law for Sanctuary
Cities Act” in 2015 and the “Stop Dangerous Cities Act” in 2016.37
The latter would have prohibited sanctuary jurisdictions from re-
ceiving block grants from the Economic Development Assistance
Programs (EDAP) and the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) Program.38  In 2016, the federal government distributed
$238 million in EDAP grants and $3 billion in CDBG grants.39  Ten
of the largest sanctuary cities collectively received $700 million in
block grants that year.40
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Arrieta-Kenna, supra note 4.
33. James Rogers, Congressman’s Bill Would Do More to Curtail Sanctuary
Cities than Trump’s Executive Order, DAILY SIGNAL (Feb. 10, 2017), https://
dailysign.al/2ECJgvC [https://perma.cc/FM6U-6GUU]; see H.R. 2057, 112th Cong.
(2011).
34. H.R. 2057 § 2.
35. Id.
36. Rogers, supra note 33.
37. See Stop Dangerous Sanctuary Cities Act, S. 87, 115th Cong. (2017); En-
force the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act, H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. (2015).
38. S. 87, § 4(a)–(b).
39. Lauren Etter & Tim Jones, Sanctuary-City Mayors Gird for Fight as
Trump Threatens Budgets, BLOOMBERG POL. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://bloom.bg/
2qqjvW8 [https://perma.cc/439J-K545].
40. Id. These cities include San Francisco, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Denver, New Orleans, Oakland, Boston, and Seattle. See also Rory Carroll et al.,
Top 10 U.S. Sanctuary Cities Face Roughly $2.27 Billion in Cuts by Trump Policy,
REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2017), https://reut.rs/2rKVo53 [https://perma.cc/RVK4-DW55].
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In 2017, the Houses of Representatives passed “Kate’s Law.”41
Like its predecessors, Kate’s Law stripped sanctuary cities of vari-
ous federal grants due to their alleged failure to comply with fed-
eral immigration law and their refusal to assist federal immigration
officials.42  However, none of these bills have been enacted.  Thus,
EO 13768 is the only federal policy currently threatening to strip
federal grant money from hundreds of localities.
EO 13768 empowers the Attorney General and the Secretary
of Homeland Security to ensure that sanctuary jurisdictions “are
not eligible to receive Federal grants,” “in their discretion and to
the extent consistent with law,” except as they deem necessary for
law-enforcement purposes.43  Their roles are divided.  The Secre-
tary of Homeland Security has the authority to designate sanctuary
jurisdictions “in his discretion and to the extent consistent with
law,”44 while the Attorney General “shall take appropriate enforce-
ment action” against any jurisdiction that “violates 8 U.S.C. [§]
1373, or which has in effect a statute, policy, or practice that pre-
vents or hinders the enforcement of Federal law.”45
Given the broad language of EO 13768, the Attorney General
may be empowered to strip billions of dollars from sanctuary cities.
Sanctuary cities received nearly $27 billion in federal money in Fis-
cal Year 2016.46  These dollars helped fund municipal services such
as school programs, housing, emergency services, and community
development.47  If the Attorney General rescinded all federal fund-
ing from sanctuary jurisdictions, a few major metropolitan areas
would bear the brunt of the cutback.  For example, Chicago would
lose approximately $5.3 billion and Washington, D.C. would forfeit
a little more than $2 billion in federal funds.48
On July 25, 2017, former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions
announced the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) first rule to imple-
ment EO 13768:  the DOJ stopped awarding the Edward Byrne
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs—a grant for local
law-enforcement agencies—to sanctuary jurisdictions, as defined by
41. Cristina Marcos, House Passes ‘Kate’s Law’ and Bill Targeting Sanctuary
Cities, HILL (June 29, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Lnflb6 [https://perma.cc/K8M8-
WMGQ].
42. Id.
43. EO 13768, supra note 2. R
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Adam Andrzejewski, Mapping $27 Billion in Federal Funding of
America’s Sanctuary Cities, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2017),  https://bit.ly/2PM5Z9u [https://
perma.cc/T5NM-552B].
47. Id.
48. Id.
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the order.49  Specifically, a jurisdiction must “allow federal immi-
gration access to detention facilities, and provide 48 hours’ notice
before they release an illegal alien wanted by federal authorities” to
receive the grant.50  This grant allocated $174 million, collectively,
to localities in Fiscal Year 2017.51  If the Attorney General prohibits
sanctuary cities from receiving all similar law-enforcement grants,
the DOJ may end up withholding $550 million in funds from sanc-
tuary cities.52
Even before the former Attorney General’s announcement,
EO 13768 spurred powerful responses from numerous sanctuary
cities.53  Various jurisdictions, from large metropolitan areas like
San Francisco and Seattle, to small towns like Chelsea, Massachu-
setts, filed lawsuits against the administration seeking to enjoin the
order.54  In their respective complaints, San Francisco and Santa
Clara alleged that EO 13768 violates Congress’s tax and spend au-
thority because it is coercive and it violates the Tenth Amendment’s
anti-commandeering principle.55  San Francisco contends that EO
13768 jeopardizes 13 percent of its annual budget, which amounts
to $1.2 billion.56  Santa Clara County fears it will lose up to 15 per-
cent of its budget if all of its federal funds are cut-off.57  As a result
of these lawsuits, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on the en-
49. Kathryn Watson, DOJ Cracking Down on Sanctuary City Funding, CBS
NEWS (July 25, 2017), https://cbsn.ws/2tCjZbI [https://perma.cc/N6D4-64TS].
50. Id.
51. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2017 STATE EDWARD BYRNE ME-
MORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) ALLOCATIONS (2017), https://bit.ly/
2R0wU6g [https://perma.cc/7HNF-6RRJ].
52. Watson, supra note 49.
53. The office of Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel called EO 13768 “unlawful”
and claimed it would “undermine[ ] public safety.”  Daniella Diaz & Laura Jarrett,
Chicago Mayor Defends Lawsuit Against DOJ Over Sanctuary Cities, CNN (Aug.
7, 2017), https://cnn.it/2SewF52 [https://perma.cc/UH4Z-P4ZS].  Mayor Ed Lee of
San Francisco stated, “‘we are still a sanctuary city’” in response to EO 13768.
Emily Green & Kevin Fagan, SF Mayor Lee Stands Up to Trump, Says City Re-
mains a Sanctuary, SFGATE (Jan. 26, 2017), https://bit.ly/2BwRQI3 [https://
perma.cc/AQQ8-HUGF].
54. Dolan, supra note 11; Beekman, supra note 11; see also Dolan & Queally,
supra note 11.
55. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 12, City of San
Francisco v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) [hereinafter San
Francisco Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Cty.
of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 5:17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter
Santa Clara Complaint].
56. San Francisco Complaint, supra note 55.
57. Santa Clara Complaint, supra note 55.
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forcement of EO 13768 in April 2017.58  The district court held that
the order violates the Spending Clause because it amounts to new
conditions on federal grants; there is an insufficient nexus between
the federal funds and the purpose of the federal program; and the
rescission of the funds would be coercive.59  Moreover, the court
held that the order amounts to federal commandeering of local
officials.60
The DOJ filed a motion to reconsider and dismiss the lawsuit
in light of the Attorney General’s directive regarding the Byrne
grant, but the court rejected the DOJ’s motions and found that the
directive was “illusory.”61  Ultimately, the district court granted the
counties’ summary judgment motion and ordered a permanent in-
junction on the same basis as its previous order granting the prelim-
inary injunction.62  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that EO 13768
violated the separation of powers doctrine because the spending
power is accorded to Congress, not the President, and Congress has
not delegated to the President the power to condition new grants
on compliance with § 1373.63  The Ninth Circuit refused to grant
58. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539–40 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
59. Id. at 532–33.
60. Id. at 533–34.
61. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1209–14 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (finding that the Attorney General’s memorandum was an illusory promise
to enforce EO 13768 narrowly because it was not a legal opinion).  Moreover, the
district court found that even if the Attorney General’s memorandum was a legal
opinion, it does not bind the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, or other executive agencies with respect to enforcement of
EO 13768. Id.  Accordingly, the court determined that the memorandum was a
formalized, but non-binding, promise not to enforce EO 13768 in an unconstitu-
tional manner.  As such, the court reasoned, the Attorney General is free to re-
voke the memorandum at any time, which makes it an illusory promise. Id.
62. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  No-
tably, the opinion is vague as to which entity the court applied the Spending Clause
analysis.  For example, the court stated that EO 13768 imposed conditions that
“the states and local jurisdictions” accepting the funds did not know at the time
they accepted the funds. Id. at 1214.  Moreover, the court stated that EO 13768
does not “make clear to states and local governments what funds are at issue and
what conditions apply.”  Yet, it states that “the Counties cannot voluntarily and
knowingly choose to accept the conditions on such funds.” Id. at 1214–15.  The
court further stated that EO 13768 “threatens to deny such sanctuary jurisdictions
all federal grants . . . on which the Counties rely” and that “Congress cannot use
the spending power in a way that compels local jurisdictions to adopt certain poli-
cies.” Id. at 1215.  However, it asserts that “States must have a ‘legitimate choice
whether to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds.’” Id. at
1214–15.
63. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2018)
[hereinafter San Francisco I].  In a similar case also before the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California, the court found that EO 13768 violated the
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deference to the Attorney General’s directive, choosing instead to
interpret the text of the EO 13768 directly.64  However, the Ninth
Circuit restricted the preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs only,
stating that the record did not support a nationwide preliminary
injunction.65
The city of Chicago also sought a preliminary injunction in re-
sponse to the DOJ’s directive.66  The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois granted Chicago’s motion on a nation-
wide basis.67  The district court held that the Attorney General’s
actions violated the separation of powers doctrine by imposing ad-
ditional conditions on the grant of federal funds without congres-
sional authority.68  The district court did not, however, make a
determination regarding Chicago’s Spending Clause argument.69
The district court later granted Chicago’s motion for summary judg-
ment and ordered a permanent injunction, holding that EO 13768
violated the separation of powers doctrine because Congress did
not empower the Attorney General to impose new conditions on
the receipt of the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance grant
funds.70
In City of Philadelphia v. Sessions,71 the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also ruled on a challenge to
EO 13768.72  The court granted Philadelphia’s motion for prelimi-
nary injunction, in part, because EO 13768 violated the Spending
Clause by imposing ambiguous conditions.73  Philadelphia subse-
quently filed an amended complaint alleging that the DOJ had not
Spending Clause because its conditions were ambiguous and not sufficiently re-
lated to the relevant federal funds’ purpose. See City of San Francisco v. Sessions,
No.17-cv-04642, 2018 WL 4859528, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2018).
64. San Francisco I, 897 F.3d at 1242–43.
65. Id. at 1243–45.
66. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 5, City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-05720).
67. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
68. Id. at 940–43.
69. Id. at 943.
70. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 876–79 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
As of August 10, 2018, the district court had not entered the permanent injunction.
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit vacated its prior decision to hear en banc the
Department of Justice’s appeal on the scope of the preliminary injunction but
maintained the stay on the preliminary injunction it had previously granted. See
City of Chicago v. Sessions, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814, at *2 (7th
Cir. Aug. 10, 2018).
71. City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 645–47.
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disbursed certain federal funds to it.74  The district again ruled, in
part, that EO 13768’s conditions violated the Spending Clause.75
The case is currently on appeal to the Third Circuit.76  Given the
constitutional questions raised by these lawsuits, and the various
rulings and future rulings by several circuit courts, the Supreme
Court will need to step in to provide finality.
Prior to the aforementioned lawsuits, Miami-Dade County
took the opposite approach; it changed its law-enforcement policies
to comply with the order.  The day after President Trump an-
nounced EO 13768, Miami-Dade County Mayor Carlos Gimenez
ordered the county’s jails to comply with any requests from federal
officials on immigration-enforcement matters.77  Mayor Gimenez
deemed the risk of non-compliance too great because Miami-Dade
County was slated to receive $355 million in federal grants for Fis-
cal Year 2017.78  On February 17, 2017, the Miami-Dade County
Commission formally adopted a resolution ending the county’s
sanctuary jurisdiction policies by a vote of nine to three, citing
Mayor Gimenez’s concerns.79
Several states have also taken action in response to EO 13768.
Texas, for example, banned sanctuary cities just four months after
President Trump issued EO 13768.80  Pursuant to that Texas law,
local-government officials and law-enforcement agents must com-
ply with detention requests from federal immigration officials.81  If
police departments fail to comply, they may be subject to civil pen-
alties.82  In response to the law, several cities in Texas, including
Houston, San Antonio, Dallas, and Austin, filed a joint lawsuit
against the state.83  Other state governments, however, have re-
74. Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief
at 7–8, City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (No.
2:17-cv-03894-MMB).
75. City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 325 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
76. See Notice of Appeal, City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General, No. 2:17-
cv-03894-MMB (E.D. Pa. filed Jan. 16, 2018).
77. Shanika Gunaratna, Miami-Dade Abandons “Sanctuary” Status One Day
After Trump’s Crackdown, CBS NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://cbsn.ws/2kziWsc
[https://perma.cc/S47A-QYU9].
78. Id.
79. Gomez, supra note 10.
80. See S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); see also Chuck Johnston &
Darran Simon, Texas Governor Signs Bill Banning Sanctuary Cities, CNN (May 8,
2017), https://cnn.it/2D7fb5n [https://perma.cc/Q39U-LBBU].
81. Tex. S.B. 4.
82. Id.
83. Houston Joins Sanctuary City Lawsuit, supra note 5.  Judge Orlando Gar-
cia of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against the law on August 30, 2017. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas,
264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 812–13 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
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jected EO 13768 and have either supported or mandated sanctuary
cities.  The California legislature, for example, passed a bill requir-
ing its localities to observe many of the policies adopted by Califor-
nia sanctuary cities.84  Additionally, the New Jersey Senate
considered a bill to reimburse New Jersey’s sanctuary cities for all
of the federal funding those cities lost due to their immigration
policies.85
The combination of EO 13768’s broad scope and the contro-
versy surrounding sanctuary cities has placed Congress’s spending
power at the forefront of the political and legal debate.  Large cities
like Chicago and San Francisco are litigating against the federal
government while Texas is witnessing an intense legal dispute be-
tween its state legislature and its most populous cities.86  These
high-profile, high-stakes litigations are occurring across the nation;
they stress the need for the Supreme Court to provide clarity with
respect to the scope of Congress’s spending power in relation to
local governments.
B. The Spending Clause
EO 13768 raises several constitutional questions, of which one
of the most important is:  what is the scope of the federal govern-
ment’s spending power?  More specifically, it raises the currently
unanswered question:  do the restrictions on the Spending Clause
protect localities themselves or just states?  Over 80 years ago, in
the landmark case of United States v. Butler,87 the Supreme Court
created the foundations of the modern “conditional spending”88
doctrine by ruling that the federal government’s power to “author-
ize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited
by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitu-
tion.”89  Instead, pursuant to the Spending Clause, the federal gov-
ernment may offer monetary grants to the states, with various
conditions attached, to “attain” objectives not thought to be within
84. S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); see Jazmine Ulloa, Califor-
nia Lawmakers Approve Landmark ‘Sanctuary State’ Bill to Expand Protections
for Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2017), https://lat.ms/2w0EOia [https://
perma.cc/B9EQ-M5VW].
85. S.B. 3007, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017); see Salvador Rizzo, N.J.
Democratic Mayors Defy Trump with Sanctuary City Orders, NORTHJERSEY.COM
(Feb. 11, 2017), https://njersy.co/2kxTRdz [https://perma.cc/7H4P-2X9H]. The New
Jersey bill, however, has not been enacted.
86. See Houston Joins Sanctuary City Lawsuit, supra note 5.
87. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
88. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 866.
89. Butler, 297 U.S. at 66.
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Article I’s “enumerated legislative fields.”90  This Article terms this
authority Congress’s “conditional spending power.”  At its heart,
the conditional spending power allows Congress to incentivize state
governments to adopt Congress’s policy preferences, but only in a
manner that preserves federalism.91  Since Butler, the Court has
heard several conditional spending power cases;92 the most impor-
tant of which are South Dakota v. Dole93 and NFIB.
In 1984, Congress enacted 23 U.S.C. § 158,94 which ordered the
Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal
highway funds from states that did not adopt a minimum drinking
age of 21 years old.95  In South Dakota v. Dole, South Dakota chal-
lenged the constitutionality of § 158, arguing that the decision to
withhold federal funds exceeded Congress’s conditional spending
power.96  In its opinion, the Court articulated the framework by
which it now evaluates Spending Clause challenges.97  While the
Court’s decision did not establish this framework, the Dole opinion
is the clearest articulation of the framework, thus making Dole the
foundation of the modern conditional spending doctrine.
In Dole, the Court clarified that Congress may offer federal
funds to the states to persuade them to enact specific policies, pro-
vided that five conditions are met.  First, the federal government
must provide the federal funds to promote the general welfare.98
“In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to
serve general public purposes,” the Dole Court stated, “courts
should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.”99  Second,
the funding must be germane to the policy the federal government
seeks to promote.100  Third, the federal government must provide
the states notice of clear and “unambiguous” conditions, thus “en-
abl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of
the consequences of their participation.”101  Fourth, the conditional
90. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“[O]bjectives not thought
to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields,’ may nevertheless be at-
tained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal
funds.”).
91. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012).
92. See Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
93. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
94. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2018)
95. Id. § 158(a).
96. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206–11.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 207.
99. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
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grants must not violate constitutional provisions.102  Finally, the of-
fer must not be coercive, meaning the federal government cannot
allow its “pressure [to] turn[ ] into compulsion.”103
In Dole, the Court reasoned that the federal government did
not violate any of the five conditions and ruled against South Da-
kota.104  The highway funds served a public purpose—reducing
drunk driving made possible by the different drinking ages in each
state—and were germane to that purpose.105  Additionally, the
Court found that the sole condition on the funds—that the state-
recipient must prohibit individuals under the age of 21 from
purchasing alcohol—was clear and unambiguous.106  The Court fur-
ther reasoned that § 158 did not violate any constitutional provi-
sions because, if South Dakota accepted the federal funds, it would
not violate any citizen’s constitutional rights.107  Moreover, the
Court reasoned that while the Twenty-First Amendment prevents
Congress from directly regulating the drinking age, the Spending
Clause allows Congress to encourage the states to regulate areas
beyond “Article I’s enumerated legislative fields.”108  Thus, the
funding did not run afoul of any constitutional principles.  Nor was
South Dakota compelled to accept Congress’s funds.  If South Da-
kota rejected the funds, it would only have lost “5% of the funds
otherwise obtainable under certain highway grant programs.”109
Such a small sum did not, in the Court’s estimation, amount to coer-
cion.110  Accordingly, Congress’s financial inducement was within
its conditional spending power; therefore, it was constitutional.
Dole remained the framework for Spending Clause cases until
2010 when the Court decided NFIB, a severely fractured decision.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the controlling opinion (the “Joint
Opinion”), which was joined in its entirety only by Justices Breyer
and Kagan.  The Joint Opinion reaffirms the fundamental premise
of prior Spending Clause cases:  restrictions on Congress’s condi-
tional spending power are “critical to ensuring that Spending
102. Id. at 210.
103. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 573, 590 (1937)).
104. Id. at 211–12.
105. Id. at 208 (“Congress found that . . . this interstate problem required a
national solution.  The means it chose to address this dangerous situation were
reasonably calculated to advance the general welfare.  The conditions upon which
States receive the funds, moreover, could not be more clearly stated by
Congress.”).
106. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
107. Id. at 209–11.
108. Id. at 207, 209–10.
109. Id. at 211.
110. Id.
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Clause legislation does not undermine the status of the States as
independent sovereigns in our federal system.”111  It also reiterated
Dole’s view that federal financial inducements are unconstitutional
when they threaten federalism, and they do so when, among other
things, “pressure turns into compulsion.”112
In the Joint Opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kagan, and
Justice Breyer reaffirmed the contractual framework that underlies
the Court’s Spending Clause analysis.  As in prior Spending Clause
cases, the Joint Opinion stated that the Spending Clause polices
contracts between the federal government and the states.113  Citing
cases such as Barnes v. Gorman114 and Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman,115 Chief Justice Roberts declared that
“Spending Clause legislation is ‘much in the nature of a con-
tract.’”116  The Joint Opinion also reaffirmed the roots of Con-
gress’s conditional spending power—namely, federalism and
contract law.117
Additionally, the Joint Opinion reiterated the five prongs of
the Dole framework.118  However, the Joint Opinion placed greater
emphasis on coercion and articulated additional elements for the
framework.  In NFIB, the Court considered whether the expansion
of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act violated the Spending
Clause.  Under the legislation, states were given a choice:  expand
Medicaid to cover “all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes
below 133 percent of the federal poverty line” and receive compen-
sation to offset most of the cost, or lose all federal funding for
Medicaid.119  The Court held that this offer constituted coercion be-
cause, rather than the “relatively mild encouragement” presented
by the federal government’s highway funding program in Dole, the
terms were “a gun to the head”120 of the state officials deciding
111. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012).
112. Id. at 577–78.
113. Id. at 577.
114. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
115. Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Pennhurst was an
important precursor to Dole.
116. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 577 (internal citations omitted).
117. Id. at 576–77 (describing the role of the Spending Clause in preserving
the structures of federalism and characterizing the nature of the Spending Clause
relationship as a contract).
118. See id. at 580–82.
119. Id. at 576, 579–80.  The federal government offered to pay for 100 per-
cent of the cost of expanding the program through 2016 and to continue paying
expansion costs in future years at gradually declining rates, ultimately bottoming
out at 90 percent. Id. at 576.
120. Id. at 581.
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whether to accept the offer.121  An essential factor in the Court’s
determination was the effect on state governments.  The Court ana-
lyzed the federal funds at issue as a proportion of the state’s overall
budget; it viewed the state as the non-federal government that was
the target of the federal government’s financial inducement.122
For this “contract” to be valid, the Joint Opinion held the
states being offered the federal financial inducement must “volun-
tarily and knowingly accept[ ] the terms of the ‘contract.’”123  States
cannot be coerced by the federal government to either voluntarily
accept or reject the terms of the federal government’s financial in-
ducement.  While Congress may attach conditions to the funds it
provides the state, “conditions [that] take the form of threats to
terminate other significant independent grants” are not conditions;
they are tools to coerce the states into acquiescence.124  The Afford-
able Care Act’s Medicaid funding conditions coerced the states to
expand Medicaid because the federal government threatened to re-
scind a state’s pre-existing Medicaid funding if the state did not
agree to participate in what the Court believed was a new
program.125
The size of the financial inducement relative to the state’s
budget, according to the Joint Opinion, also helps determine
whether the inducement is coercive.  The Joint Opinion distin-
guished the Medicaid expansion from the highway funding at issue
in Dole, clarifying that South Dakota would have been able to re-
ject the funds “not merely in theory but in fact” because Congress’s
financial inducement was equal to half of one percent of South Da-
kota’s budget.126  According to the Dole Court and the Joint Opin-
ion, such a small grant relative to South Dakota’s budget could not
constitute coercion.127  In contrast, under the Affordable Care Act,
a state that opted out of the Medicaid expansion stood “to lose not
merely ‘a relatively small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid fund-
ing, but all of it.”128  Taking away Medicaid funding from the aver-
age state would have cost “over 10 percent of a State’s overall
121. Id.
122. See id. at 581–82 (describing the Medicaid expansion’s impact on states,
not localities).
123. Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 580.
125. Id. at 582–83 (“The original program was designed to cover medical ser-
vices for four particular categories of the needy . . . .  It is no longer a program to
care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive national
plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”).
126. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 580–81.
127. Id. at 580 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)).
128. Id. at 581.
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budget,” a figure 20 times larger than the highway funding Con-
gress withheld from South Dakota in Dole.129  A financial induce-
ment of this size relative to a state’s budget is not, the Joint Opinion
contends, the “mild encouragement” that the Spending Clause pro-
tects but an “economic dragooning that leaves the States with no
real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”130  With-
out defining clear limits on how much Congress can offer to a state
or rescind from the state’s budget under the Spending Clause, the
Joint Opinion declared that a loss of ten percent is unconstitution-
ally coercive.131
In justifying its ruling, the Court also touched on Pennhurst’s
prohibition of retroactive or unambiguous conditions.132  While the
Joint Opinion recognized the federal government’s ability to alter
the nature of pre-existing, federally funded state programs, pro-
vided that the state recipients knew of that power prior to accepting
the funding, it ruled that Congress’s Medicaid expansion was be-
yond a mere alteration:  it was a “shift in kind, not merely de-
gree.”133  According to Chief Justice Roberts:
Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and
expanded the boundaries of these categories.  Under the Afford-
able Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet
the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with
income below 133 percent of the poverty level.  It is no longer a
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element
of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health in-
surance coverage.134
When they originally accepted Medicaid funding, the states
could not have reasonably anticipated that Congress would revise
the program so dramatically.135  Because the Medicaid expansion
was an unanticipated change, the conditions set forth in the Social
Security Act did not provide the states with adequate notice that
acceptance of Medicaid funding under the Affordable Care Act
would allow Congress to make such onerous demands of the
129. Id. at 581–82.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 582.
132. Id. at 583–84 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 17, 25 (1981)).
133. Id. at 583.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 584–85 (“A State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s reserva-
tion of the right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid program included the power to
transform it so dramatically.”).
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state.136  Consequently, the Court found the Affordable Care Act’s
Medicaid expansion provision violated the Spending Clause’s un-
ambiguous-conditions prong.137
But the Joint Opinion did more than apply the framework and
principles outlined in Dole to the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid
expansion provision.  The Joint Opinion also added new elements
to the Dole test by evaluating the Affordable Care Act’s political
ramifications on state officials, which the Court termed “political
accountability,” and the states’ reliance on the pre-existing federal
funding.138  Because the Joint Opinion added factors to Dole, this
Article refers to the Court’s Spending Clause test as the Dole-NFIB
framework.  Citing New York v. United States,139 a landmark anti-
commandeering case, the Joint Opinion argued that federal coer-
cion of the states through financial inducements undermines the
federal government’s political accountability.140  In New York, the
Court reasoned that if the federal government could tell the states
how to regulate local matters, then “state officials . . . will bear the
brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised
the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision.”141  Giving such power to the federal
government would undermine the structure of federalism; thus, the
exercise of such power would violate the Tenth Amendment.142
The Joint Opinion found that financial inducements that a state is
obligated to accept pose the same threat to federalism as direct or-
ders from the federal government.143  Where the state does not
have a “legitimate choice whether to accept the federal conditions
in exchange for federal funds,” “the Federal Government can
achieve its objectives without accountability, just as in New York
and Printz.”144  Therefore, it is relevant to the Spending Clause
analysis whether and, presumably, to what extent a federal grant
136. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 584.
137. Id. at 583–85.
138. Id. at 578 (describing how the federal government must allow state offi-
cials to choose to accept federal funding because the state’s citizens will hold those
officials responsible for that choice); see also id. at 581 (explaining how the states
developed “intricate statutory and administrative regimes” to accomplish their
objectives under the original Medicaid regime).
139. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
140. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 578.
141. New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
142. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 577–78 (“[T]he Constitution simply does not
give Congress the authority to require a state to regulate.”).
143. Id. (describing how allowing Congress to impose requirements on how
states govern would threaten the very foundations of the system of government
created by the Framers).
144. Id. at 578.
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shifts political blame to the state officials who decide to accept the
grant.145
According to Professor Samuel Bagenstos, the Joint Opinion
also considered the fact that Medicaid is a pre-existing, cooperative
federal-state program.146  Bagenstos argues that “[i]n determining
whether a state has a real choice, the Chief Justice found it signifi-
cant that the new conditions were attached to continued participa-
tion in an entrenched and lucrative cooperative program.”147  In
other words, because the states and the federal government were
already engaged in a long-standing and expensive cooperative pro-
gram, the Medicaid expansion was more coercive than an identical
mandate would have been for a less-expensive or less-established
cooperative program.148
NFIB severely fractured the Court; only three justices signed
on to the controlling opinion, and eight justices filed three dissents.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito filed a dissenting opin-
ion (the “Joint Dissent”).  While not legally binding, the Joint Dis-
sent is worthy of consideration because it fell just one vote short of
being the controlling opinion.  At the heart of the Joint Dissent is
its declaration that “[o]nce it is recognized that spending-power leg-
islation cannot coerce state participation, two questions remain:  (1)
What is the meaning of coercion in this context?  (2) Is the ACA’s
expanded Medicaid coverage coercive?”149  Accordingly, the Joint
Dissent focuses almost exclusively on Dole’s coercion prong.150
When it refers to “coercion,” the Joint Dissent means:  did the
state have the actual, rather than purely legal, capability to reject
the offer of federal funds?151  The magnitude of the money at stake
is generally determinative of whether the state has an actual choice.
The amount of money at stake dictates the state’s decision because
a state may be unable to refuse a large offer or a state may be una-
ble to create enough revenue to otherwise match the amount.152
According to the Joint Dissent, if the federal government creates
145. See id. (explaining how political accountability is a key component of the
federal system).
146. Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 871 (arguing that the Joint Opinion placed
emphasis on the fact that Medicaid was already an established program).
147. Id.
148. In contrast, Dole did not touch on the nature of the pre-existing relation-
ship between the federal and state governments with respect to the federal funds at
issue.
149. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 678.
150. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 871 (explaining how the joint dissenters
focused on what choice the states realistically, not just theoretically, had).
151. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 678–80.
152. Id. at 680.
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such a situation, this is coercion.153  The Joint Dissent’s view is a
significant departure from both the Joint Opinion’s understanding
of coercion and the Court’s ruling in Dole—both of which focus on
a grant’s size as a percentage of the state’s budget rather than the
grant’s magnitude in absolute terms.154
In light of its unique understanding of coercion, the Joint Dis-
sent found that the Affordable Care Act’s take-it-or-leave-it, high-
financial-stakes approach to the Medicaid expansion clearly indi-
cated Congress’s understanding that it was not providing the states
an actual choice.155  According to the Joint Dissent, “the sheer size
of this federal spending program in relation to state expenditures
means that a State would be very hard pressed to compensate for
the loss of federal funds by cutting other spending or raising addi-
tional revenue.”156  In other words, the states could not reject the
federal government’s offer because too many federal dollars were
at stake and state revenues were too small to compensate for the
loss of federal funds.
The Joint Dissent also contends that Congress ensured that
states could not choose to reject the expansion because it did not
devise a back-up plan to provide Medicaid for residents of the
states that rejected the expansion.157  This combination resulted in a
Faustian choice:  (A) accept the terms of the Medicaid expansion
and receive near-complete funding; or (B) lose all Medicaid funding
and choose between impossibly raising revenues to sustain Medi-
caid or ending the program.158  Such a choice, the Joint Dissent ar-
153. Id. (“When a heavy federal tax is levied to support a federal program
that offers large grants to the States, States may, as a practical matter, be unable to
refuse to participate in the federal program and to substitute a state alternative.”).
154. Compare id. at 582 (Joint Opinion), with id. at 683 (Joint Dissent); see
also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
155. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 681.  In the Joint Dissent’s view, when Congress
designed the Affordable Care Act, it “unambiguously signaled its belief that every
State would have no real choice but to go along with the Medicaid expansion.” Id.
156. Id. at 683.
157. Id. at 686 (“If Congress had thought that States might actually refuse to
go along with the expansion of Medicaid, Congress would surely have devised a
backup scheme so that the most vulnerable groups in our society, those previously
eligible for Medicaid, would not be left out in the cold.”).
158. For further analysis of the Court’s holding in NFIB, see Amdur, supra
note 9; Bagenstos, supra note 6; Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Clauses After NFIB
v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (2014); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion,
Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283 (2013); Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional
Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM.
U. L. REV. 577 (2013).
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gued, is no choice at all,159 and the Medicaid expansion therefore
violates the Spending Clause.
Notably, the Joint Dissent, like the Joint Opinion and the
Court’s precedent, conceives of the Spending Clause as a mecha-
nism to govern contracts between the federal government and the
states.  According to the Joint Dissent, the federal government en-
ters into a contract with the state when the state accepts the offer of
federal funds.160  Moreover, it asserts that “just as a contract is
voidable if coerced, ‘[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate
under the spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily
and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.”’”161
The Joint Opinion and Joint Dissent’s focus on coercion and
contract law and the Joint Opinion’s additional focus on political
accountability indicate a fundamental concept of the conditional
spending power:  political agency.  The Joint Opinion and the Joint
Dissent clearly agree that the limitations on the Spending Clause
safeguard federalism by protecting the states’ ability to choose
whether to contract with the federal government.162  A state’s abil-
ity to voluntarily and knowingly accept the federal government’s
offer is best described as the state’s political agency.  Thus, political
agency is a central component of the coercion prong of the Spend-
ing Clause analysis and the conditional spending power.
II. THE PROBLEM OF LOCALISM: HOW FEDERALISM ACTUALLY
WORKS
The Court designed the Dole-NFIB framework to prevent the
federal government from commandeering non-federal government
actors through coercive financial inducements.163  By protecting
non-federal government actors from coercion, the Court’s Dole-
NFIB framework begs the question: who is the federal government
coercing?  The default assumption is that the federal government is
coercing the state because its political agency is for sale.  In many
159. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 688–89 (clarifying that the Affordable Care Act’s
success depended on the participation of every state in the Medicaid expansion, no
matter if the participation was voluntary or not).
160. Id. at 676.
161. Id. at 676–77 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
162. Compare id. at 577 (explaining how Congress legitimately exercises its
spending power when it allows states to knowingly and voluntarily participate in
the grant program), with id. at 678–79 (explaining that measuring how coercive a
federal grant is means measuring whether the states can voluntarily choose to par-
ticipate in that grant program).
163. Id. at 557–78.
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cases, however, local governments decide whether to accept or re-
ject federal funds.164  In those instances, local governments, not the
states, are the ones in danger of being coerced.
To be coerced, the entity must be able to exercise some mean-
ingful amount of agency.  If the entity cannot act independently,
then it cannot be coerced by the federal government.  Thus, agency
is at the heart of coercion, which is at the heart of the conditional
spending power.  Localism, therefore, presents a problem.  Con-
trary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hunter v. Pittsburgh, local
governments are not mere administrative units of the state.165  Far
from it.  Instead, local governments are what they purport to be:
governments.  As elected governments, localities, like their state
governments, have political agency.  In other words, local govern-
ments make political decisions for their constituents, such as
whether to accept federal funds subject to conditions.166
Protecting federalism by preserving the political agency of non-
federal government actors is at the heart of the conditional spend-
ing power.  Local governments have political agency.  Therefore,
the Dole-NFIB framework must be applied to localities directly
when localities decide whether to accept federal funds.
A. Agency: The Crux of the Conditional Spending Power
Doctrine
Agency is the key consideration underlying the Spending
Clause.  Four major elements of the Dole-NFIB framework make it
clear that agency is key because these elements only apply to the
entity that has the authority to decide to accept federal funds.167
164. See Pasachoff, supra note 158, at 652–53.
165. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal corpo-
rations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the government powers of the State as may be entrusted to
them . . . .”); see infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the theory of federalism of those who
subscribe to the Hunter view).
166. See infra Part II.B.3.
167. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 577–81 (clarifying that the federalist structure of
U.S. government mandates that entities who contract with the federal government
do so voluntarily and knowingly, without coercion, and for the purpose of main-
taining the “general welfare” of the nation); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
207–08 (1987) (explaining how the spending power is subject to several general
restrictions, including that the federal government offer the grant to the deciding
entity with unambiguous conditions so that the entity can make a knowledgeable
and voluntary decision).
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1. Notice of Clear Conditions
First, the Dole-NFIB framework requires the federal govern-
ment to make the conditions of its financial inducements clear to
state officials before those officials accept the offer.168  The purpose
of this rule is obvious:  to ensure that the state can make a fully
informed decision prior to accepting the inducements.  If the fed-
eral government could determine retroactively or obscure its condi-
tions, then federal government could use the power of the purse to
commandeer the states.  Without knowing all of the conditions,
states would agree to a contractual relationship with the federal
government from which it could not escape.  In other words, the
states’ political agency would be compromised because they would
not be able to make informed decisions.
In many cases, however, localities, not the states, decide
whether to accept certain federal grants.169  Accordingly, to ensure
that a locality can properly exercise its political agency, the federal
government must also make the locality aware of all the conditions
of the federal grant.  The Court requires the federal government to
provide clear conditions to the deciding officials.  This requirement
allows the deciding officials to make a fully informed decision.  In a
situation where the localities are the decision-makers, the federal
government should provide the localities with clear conditions.
However, if the courts consider the state officials to be the relevant
officials, the federal government would not be required to inform
the local officials.  In such a scenario, the federal government’s de-
cision not to inform the localities of all the conditions would frus-
trate the purpose of the clear-conditions requirement and
undermine the political agency of localities.
Aside from comporting with the logic of the clear-conditions
prong of the Dole-NFIB framework, requiring the federal govern-
ment to inform local officials when they decide whether to accept
federal funds follows directly from Supreme Court precedent.  In
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,170
the Court stated that the Spending Clause’s clear statement rule
requires the judiciary to view the offer of federal funds “from the
perspective of a state official who is engaged in the process of de-
ciding whether the State should accept [those] funds and the obliga-
tions that go with [them].”171  In this passage, the Court
168. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 583; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
169. See infra Part II.A.2.
170. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
171. Id. at 296.
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unequivocally recognized that the agents who decide whether to ac-
cept or reject federal funding are central to the Spending Clause
analysis.  In Murphy, the decision-maker was a state official;172 but
in many other cases, the decision-maker is a local official.173  Thus,
the Court has mandated that when a federal court applies the
Spending Clause analysis, it must consider the perspective of the
deciding local official.  To satisfy the clear-conditions prong of the
Spending Clause analysis, the federal government must notify the
local official of all the conditions associated with the federal grant.
If the federal government fails to provide the local official with such
notice, it compromises the local official’s political agency and, by
extension, the very foundations of federalism.
2. Non-Coercive Inducement
The coercion prong of the Dole-NFIB framework also rein-
forces the centrality of political agency in the Spending Clause anal-
ysis.  In NFIB, the Court held that Congress cannot hold “a gun to
the head” of the state.174  In other words, the state must freely de-
cide to either accept or reject federal funding.  Otherwise, the fed-
eral government can coerce the states to act, which compromises
the states’ political agency, thus undermining federalism.  Where
the locality, not the state government, decides whether to accept
federal funds, however, the locality is the entity being coerced.
Thus, its political agency is undermined when the federal govern-
ment offers a coercive inducement.  Therefore, the courts would
frustrate the purpose of the non-coercion prong if they did not view
localities as the subject of coercion in cases where local govern-
ments have the authority to accept federal funding.
For an illustration, consider Professor Mitchell Berman’s in-
sights into the Joint Opinion in NFIB.175  Berman noted that “the
usual way in which one puts wrongful pressure on a target’s choices
is by threatening to wrong him if he does not comply with the
threatener’s ‘demand’ or ‘condition.’”176  Under Berman’s view,
therefore, the federal government can only pressure the entity that
is empowered to choose whether to accept or reject its financial
offers.  Consider the following federal grants:  the State Criminal
172. Id.
173. See infra Part II.B.2.
174. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–81 (2012) (clari-
fying how the Spending Clause derives its legitimacy from a state’s ability to volun-
tarily accept the terms of the contract).
175. Berman, supra note 158, at 1292.
176. Id.
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Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) grant;177 the Economic Devel-
opment Administration (EDA) grant;178 the CDBG grant,179 specif-
ically the Entitlement Communities Program,180 the Section 108
Loan Guarantee Program,181 and the Neighborhood Stabilization
Program;182 and the Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) grant.183  The federal government offers each of these
grants directly to localities.184  For each of these grants, the federal
government’s “target” is a local government because a local gov-
ernment accepts the funds.  Thus, for these specific grants, the fed-
eral government can apply “wrongful pressure” only on the local
government.185  If the federal government coerced a local govern-
ment to accept the SCAAP, EDA, CDBG, or COPS grants, the
federal government would threaten the local government’s agency,
but not the state’s agency.  Therefore, if a federal court assesses the
federal inducement’s coercive effect on the state only, it fails to
consider the inducement’s coercive effect on the true decision-
maker:  the locality.
3. Principles of Contract Law
The Joint Opinion also views the Spending Clause as rooted in
contract law, particularly the concept of reliance.186  As with the
clear-conditions and non-coercion requirements, the principles of
contract law only apply to the entity engaging in the contract.
Where local governments make the decision to accept federal
funds, these governments exercise their agency by entering into a
177. State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), BUREAU JUST. AS-
SISTANCE, https://bit.ly/2Gtu9Gw [https://perma.cc/6WU2-L3TP].
178. Funding Opportunities, U.S. ECON. DEV. ADMIN., https://bit.ly/1RR2Kxk
[https://perma.cc/UL4B-R3QB].
179. Community Development Block Grant Program – CDBG, HUD.GOV,
https://bit.ly/2EzsA7x [https://perma.cc/4BHD-C8CU].
180. Community Development Block Grant Entitlement Program, HUD EX-
CHANGE, https://bit.ly/29AEmPE [https://perma.cc/974Q-2JNE].
181. Section 108 Loan Guarantee Program, HUD EXCHANGE, https://bit.ly/
2CnyWFn [https://perma.cc/7ETC-R629].
182. Neighborhood Stabilization Program Data, HUD USER, https://bit.ly/
2Sap3Am [https://perma.cc/D5K5-GSU9].
183. COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., https://bit.ly/2lafkwo [https://
perma.cc/56QD-8TX8].
184. Angelo Mathay et al., How Much Funding for Sanctuary Jurisdictions
Could Be at Risk?, CTR. FOR A]M. PROGRESS (Mar. 7, 2017), https://ampr.gs/
2pzMfNH [https://perma.cc/53NY-FC39] (listing the five federal grant programs
that might be affected by EO 13768).
185. See Berman, supra note 158, at 1292 (defining coercion as exerting
“wrongful pressure” on an individual so that the individual acts how the coercer
intended).
186. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012).
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contract with the federal government.  Contract law seeks to pro-
tect an entity’s agency by prohibiting coercive force by the
counterparty.187  The pivotal entity in a contractual relationship is
the one that can manifest assent regarding the funds offered, which
is often a locality.
The Joint Dissent agrees that contract law underlies the Spend-
ing Clause, thereby prohibiting the federal government from coerc-
ing its bargaining partner.188  In NFIB, the state was the relevant
actor in accepting or rejecting the Medicaid funding.189  But for
many federal grants, local governments are the relevant actors.
Therefore, the contract law principles included in the Dole-NFIB
framework protect the agency of local governments.
The Joint Opinion also emphasizes that Congress sought to
withdraw funding from a long-standing program, indicating that
such withdrawal was more coercive than it would have been other-
wise.190  Underlying this argument is the concept of reliance.  Be-
cause the states had participated in Medicaid for so long, the Joint
Opinion indicates they had established reliance interests in the fed-
eral funds.  Disrupting this reliance interest appears to have further
substantiated the states’ argument that Congress’s action was
coercive.191
4. Political Accountability
The Court’s concern for political accountability in NFIB fur-
ther underscores the pivotal role of agency in the Spending Clause
analysis.  In NFIB, the Court expressed its concern that federal
grants thwart political accountability because these grants entrench
voters’ policy preferences while obscuring the culprit who ends the
policy.192  According to the Court, “the political accountability key
to our federal system” would suffer if voters do not know which
government officials—federal or state—to blame for a particular
program.193  The Court feared that the federal government could
create undue pressure on state officials by threatening to blame
187. “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by
the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is
voidable.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1981); see also Berman, supra note 158, at 1298.
188. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 676–77.
189. Id. at 538–43 (describing the facts of the case and the nature of the states’
challenge to the Affordable Care Act).
190. Id. at 583–84; see Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 882.
191. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 582.
192. Id. at 578.
193. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK203.txt unknown Seq: 30 30-JAN-19 12:47
450 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:421
these officials for refusing to accept continued Medicaid funds in
exchange for supporting a new program.194  By shifting the blame
to the state officials, the federal government undermines the states’
agency.195
In NFIB, the Court reasoned that voters can only hold state
officials accountable for their decision to accept or reject federal
grants if those officials have a legitimate choice whether to do so.196
In other words, courts must protect the states’ agency so state offi-
cials can make a decision for which their constituents can fairly hold
them accountable.  But where local government officials decide
whether to accept grants, it is their political capital that is unduly
burdened.197  The Joint Opinion’s concern for political accountabil-
ity also applies to local officials in such cases.  The Court’s concern
for ensuring that the state entity exercises its political agency is re-
flected in the Dole-NFIB framework’s requirement of political ac-
countability.198  Thus, agency lies at the heart of the Dole-NFIB
framework.  Because local governments are the ones exercising
agency when deciding to accept federal funds, courts employing the
Spending Clause analysis should not forget about the localities.
B. Localist Federalism
The purpose of the Dole-NFIB framework is to preserve the
agency of the non-federal government entity with which the federal
government is bargaining.  As the previous section asserted, local
governments, like their state governments, exercise political agency.
Critics may retort that local governments do not, in fact, have such
agency.  They would argue that the landmark Supreme Court case
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh unequivocally held that cities are just
194. Id. (“[I]t may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disap-
proval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”).
195. Id.
196. Id. (“[S]tate officials can fairly be held politically accountable for choos-
ing to accept or refuse the federal offer.”).
197. In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, the
Court held that the Spending Clause’s clear-statement rule requires the judiciary
to “view the [offer of federal funds] from the perspective of a state official who is
engaged in the process of deciding whether the State should accept [those] funds
and the obligations that go with [them].”  Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. Educ. v.
Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).  With this statement, the Court unequivocally
recognized that the agents who decide whether to accept or reject federal funding
are central to the Spending Clause analysis.
198. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 578.
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instruments of states.199  Therefore, “[c]oercing cities amounts to
coercing states.”200  This Article terms this perspective the “Hunter
Model” because proponents of this perspective would apply the
Dole-NFIB framework to the locality’s state government, rather
than its local government, to determine whether federal grants of-
fered to localities violate the Spending Clause.
Yet, the Hunter Model reflects neither how American federal-
ism functions in practice nor the evolution of the legal doctrine of
local government autonomy.  For decades, state statutes and federal
and state judicial doctrine have entrenched the formal authority of
general-jurisdiction local governments and strengthened their status
as mini-sovereigns.201  As a result, local governments have suffi-
cient formal legal authority and autonomy to raise the federalism
concerns that the conditional spending power doctrine seeks to ad-
dress.  Those who endorse the Hunter Model ignore the “dynamic
nature of federalism in practice” and fail to ensure that courts use
“constitutional federalism” to protect federalism as it exists on the
ground.202  This section elaborates on local government’s history of
exercising significant political agency and the conceptual limitations
of state supremacy that restrain our understanding of federalism.
1. Legal Background: Dillon’s Rule, Hunter, and Home Rule
In 1868, Judge John Dillon articulated the foundational theory
of state supremacy over local government.  In his opinion in City of
Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad,203 Judge Dillon
declared that states are supreme over local governments because
“[m]unicipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their pow-
199. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); see also Noah
Feldman, Sanctuary Cities Are Safe, Thanks to Conservatives, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
29, 2016), https://bloom.bg/2SHRpBG [https://perma.cc/6EPG-BA7P].
200. Feldman, supra note 199.
201. SCHRAGGER, supra note 15, at 81 (“As a formal matter, cities in the R
United States enjoy a significant amount of legal authority, at least when com-
pared with cities in some other western democracies.”).
202. Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long
Founding Moment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 397, 402–03 (2015).  As Professor LaCroix
notes:
Studying the evolution of [the spending power] over time, especially
where the text itself remains constant, demonstrates that ideas about fed-
eral structure are not fixed.  Therefore, constitutional federalism itself is
not fixed—a particularly important insight in an area of constitutional
doctrine that is dominated by originalist approaches. . . . Since the earliest
days of the Republic, federalism has been an unstable and contested con-
cept, worked out through the meshing of theory and practice.
Id. at 397, 402.
203. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
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ers and rights wholly from, the [state] legislature.”204  Judge Dillon
refined his views in his treatise Commentaries on the Law of Munic-
ipal Corporations.205  In this treatise, Judge Dillon articulated a le-
gal principle that would come to be known as “Dillon’s Rule.”
According to Dillon’s Rule, “local governments may exercise only
those powers ‘granted in express words,’ or ‘those necessarily or
fairly implied in or incident to, the powers expressly granted,’ or
‘those essential to the declared objects and purpose of the [munici-
pal] corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable.’”206
Dillon’s Rule dominated legal thought on local government law for
decades.207  In fact, it was adopted by nearly every state during the
last quarter of the 19th century.208
Thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court decided the
landmark case Hunter v. Pittsburgh, which agreed with Judge Dil-
lon’s belief that cities are merely extensions of states.  The previous
year, pursuant to Pennsylvania state law, the city of Pittsburgh an-
nexed the city of Allegheny.209  Angered by the annexation, re-
sidents of Allegheny sued the city of Pittsburgh, arguing that the
annexation violated the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.  In a unanimous opinion, the
Court rejected Allegheny’s claims and stated that “[m]unicipal cor-
porations are political subdivisions of the State, created as conve-
nient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of
the state as may be entrusted to them.”210  Moreover, the Court
declared that the Constitution does not constrain a state’s authority
204. Id. at 475.
205. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATIONS 449–50 (5th ed. 1911).
206. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Govern-
ment Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990) (quoting DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET
AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: CASES AND
MATERIALS 83 (2d ed. 1983)).
207. Elijah Swiney, John Forrest Dillon Goes to School: Dillon’s Rule in Ten-
nessee Ten Years After Southern Constructors, 79 TENN. L. REV. 103, 105–06
(2011) (discussing the prominence of Dillon’s Rule among scholars of local govern-
ment law).
208. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1123 (2007)
(explaining how Dillion’s Rule gained widespread acceptance among politicians in
the late 19th century); Louis V. Csoka, The Dream of Greater Municipal Auton-
omy: Should the Legislature or the Courts Modify Dillon’s Rule, A Common Law
Restraint on Municipal Power?, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 194, 199 (2007) (explaining how
Dillon’s Rule gained popularity and acceptance in state courts throughout the 20th
century).
209. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 174–75 (1907).
210. Id. at 178.
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over its localities.211  To the Hunter Court, municipalities are state
agencies, just as Judge Dillon said they were.
Just a few years later, however, the Progressive Era ushered in
the decline of Dillon’s Rule.  As Dillion’s Rule declined, the so-
called “Home Rule” became more popular.212  Professor Richard
Briffault notes:
states adopted constitutional amendments giving localities the
power to adopt their own charters and to legislate with respect to
local matters.  The home rule movement had two goals:  to undo
Dillon’s Rule by giving localities broad lawmaking authority and
to provide local governments freedom from state interference in
areas of local concern.213
Home Rule was an outgrowth of the Progressive Era’s reforms,
seeking to “free cities” from “the state’s political machines” and
dominant rural politicians.214  Home Rule took two forms:  Imperio
and Legislative. Imperio Home Rule treated municipalities as a
“state within a state, possessed of the full police power with respect
to municipal affairs and also enjoying a correlative degree of immu-
nity from state legislative interference.”215  Similarly, Legislative
Home Rule reversed Dillon’s Rule because state legislatures en-
dowed local governments with police powers, subject to their au-
thority to restrict or deny certain powers.216  Thus, for the vast
majority of local governments, the Home-Rule movement effec-
tively unwound Dillon’s Rule.217
By 1990, 41 states had given their localities Home Rule or a
partial version of it.218  Today, most states still have Home Rule for
their localities.219  Thus, rather than retain top-down control of lo-
211. Id. at 179.
212. SCHRAGGER, supra note 15, at 62–64.
213. Briffault, supra note 206, at 10. But see SCHRAGGER, supra note 15, at 63
(“Home rule was not an effort to shift power to representatives of the local gov-
ernment; it was oftentimes instead an effort to limit the law-making role of the
city’s state legislative delegation, which was (according to reformers) responding
too readily to every costly demand of their urban constituents.”).  Even accepting
this view, the Home-Rule movement did empower most local governments and
deconstructed the prior era’s model of centralized state control.
214. See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 1163, 1186 (2018).
215. Briffault, supra note 206, at 10.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 10–11 (“In a sense, it reverses Dillon’s Rule—all powers are
granted until retracted.”).
218. Id.
219. See JON D. RUSSEL & AARON BOSTROM, FEDERALISM, DILLON RULE
AND HOME RULE 6 (2016), http://bit.ly/2QYk3RX [https://perma.cc/9PP4-T7QZ]
(explaining that 44 states have adopted Home Rule in some capacity).
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cal governments, the states themselves have opted to establish their
local governments as the third-tier of American federalism.  For ex-
ample, in all states, localities are governed by elected officials,
rather than directed by bureaucrats, and exercise significant politi-
cal powers, such as levying taxes and condemning land.220
Moreover:
Even during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—
the heyday of Dillon’s Rule, the era of plenary state power and
the unsteady beginnings of home rule—American city govern-
ments pioneered in public health, education, parks, libraries,
water supply, sanitation and sewage removal, street paving and
lighting and mass transit, building the infrastructure that still
serves modern urban centers.221
Local governments still exercise significant authority in these
areas.  Although the Court in Hunter viewed local governments as
administrative agencies of the states,222 local governments are, and
have been for decades, political entities that exercise significant au-
tonomy and authority over their constituents, just like state
governments.
2. Conceptual Limits of State Supremacy
Although the Hunter Model and Dillon’s Rule rely on the idea
that states are supreme over local governments, the foundations of
this idea are not as certain and expansive as it may appear.223  Many
scholars view Hunter as the Court’s unambiguous affirmation of
state supremacy over local government.224  Yet, Professor Roderick
Hills notes that Hunter simply expanded the Court’s earlier prece-
dent of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward225 by holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide protections for
local governments, unlike private corporations, from state regula-
220. For a discussion of localities’ general powers and the evolution of those
powers, see Briffault, supra note 206.
221. Briffault, supra note 206, at 15.
222. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal corpo-
rations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to
them.”).
223. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1201, 1207–16 (1999) (highlighting the uncertain foundations of the Hunter
Model).
224. See infra Parts II.B.1, IV.A (discussing the origins and proponents of the
Hunter Model).
225. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
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tion.226  Thus, Hills argues that Hunter’s narrow holding does not
inevitably lead to the conclusion that Congress cannot, without the
approval of the state, expand local governments’ powers through its
conditional spending power or its other powers.227  Rather, Hunter
concludes that municipal corporations have fewer protections from
state police power than private corporations do.
Hills also posits that the Court’s anti-commandeering principle
does not necessarily support state supremacy.228  The anti-comman-
deering principle prohibits the federal government from forcing
state or local officials to conduct business on its behalf.229  How-
ever, Hills argues the principle does not apply when federal law
“preempts state laws that limit the powers of state or local officials”
since such laws do not “require anyone to do anything.”230  When
federal law preempts state law in this context, local governments
that want to assist the federal government are allowed, but not re-
quired, to do so.  Moreover, federal-local bargaining at the expense
of the state or federal empowerment of localities through preemp-
tion also do not necessarily undermine federalism.231  In such cases,
the federal government is not “supplant[ing] nonfederal power with
federal power,” as is the case in the anti-commandeering context.
Instead, the federal government is distributing power from one
non-federal entity to another.232
In addition, the Court’s concern for political accountability as a
safeguard of federalism does not justify state supremacy.  A state
will remain blameless if the federal government preempts the
state’s authority to restrict a locality’s power to facilitate a federal
policy and the locality enforces the federal policy.  If, to promote a
federal policy, the federal government preempts the state from
226. Hills, supra note 223, at 1209. Woodward is an important case because it
is the first time the Court drew a clear distinction between municipal and private
corporations; this line restricts state power over the latter but not the former. See
Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 58, 67 n.34 (2018) (citing Woodward as the case where the Supreme Court
distinguished municipal corporations from private corporations).
227. Hills, supra note 223, at 1209–10.
228. Id. at 1211–12.
229. The Supreme Court established the anti-commandeering principles in
Printz v. United States and New York v. United States. See Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down federal legislation compelling state law-en-
forcement officers to perform federally mandated background checks on handgun
purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating provi-
sions of an Act that would have compelled a state to either take title to nuclear
waste or enact particular state waste regulations).
230. Hills, supra note 223, at 1211 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 1214.
232. Id.
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placing restrictions on local governments, and a local government
promotes that policy, neither the federal government nor the local
government will be able to shift the blame to the state.233  In such a
scenario, the federal government and the local government have
taken two “visible action[s]”:  (1) the federal government pre-
empted a state law; and (2) the local government implemented a
federal policy.234  Meanwhile, the state government has not taken
any “visible action that might invite retribution from affected vot-
ers.”235  Instead, it is the local and federal officials who have taken
visible actions and are thus at risk of receiving retribution.  While
Hills ultimately endorses the notion of state supremacy, his criti-
cisms illustrate how American federalism actually has three tiers:
federal, state, and local.
Professor Kathleen Morris has criticized Hunter even more ag-
gressively, arguing that the case is based on three faulty assump-
tions.  First, Hunter conflates “state government” and the
“sovereign state.”236  In Hunter, the Court stated that state govern-
ments are sovereign within their territorial jurisdictions.237  How-
ever, Morris points out that 38 state constitutions define the people
as the sovereign.238  Because “the people” are sovereign within a
state’s boundaries, the state government does not have the implicit
supreme authority over localities that Hunter accords it.239
Hunter’s second faulty assumption is the belief that state gov-
ernments established local governments.240  On the contrary, the
original state constitutions recognized the pre-existing local politi-
cal entities, which included contemporary local governments:  coun-
ties, cities, towns, and townships.241  Moreover, “there was never a
time—and likely never will be—when a state’s government can
constitutionally” eliminate all local governments.242
Hunter’s final faulty assumption is the view that localities oper-
ate “solely as instrumentalities of state governments.”243  Localities
233. Id. at 1213–14.
234. See id. at 1212 (arguing the condition of “political accountability” retains
less weight when the federal government simply authorizes a state or local official
to take an action, rather than requiring them to do so).
235. Id.
236. Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012).
237. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–80 (1907).
238. Morris, supra note 236, at 6.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 30.
242. Id. at 31.
243. Id. at 7.
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serve state governments in some contexts, but serve their constitu-
encies in many others, including when the needs of their constitu-
ents conflict with the needs of the state government.244  For
example, consider San Francisco’s challenge to California’s prohibi-
tion on gay marriage.  In 2004, the San Francisco City Attorney
sued California for violations of the state constitution’s privacy,
equal protection, and due process provisions.245  When the Califor-
nia Supreme Court heard the case, it did not raise questions over
the City’s standing to challenge the state.246  Rather, it was unques-
tioned that the city was representing its constituents, whose inter-
ests conflicted with state law; it was equally obvious that such a
challenge was an appropriate action and was not a non-sensical
fight between the state government and its instrumentality.247
Not only is Hunter poorly and inaccurately reasoned, Professor
Morris argues it has been implicitly overturned by Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins.248  In Erie, the Court prohibited federal courts from cre-
ating “federal general common law.”249  In Hunter, the Court found
that the “nature of municipal corporations” was “to be acted upon
wherever [ ] applicable,”250 yet no federal law nor the Constitution
empowers the Court to determine how states should allocate power
among its municipalities.251  Thus, the Court’s ruling in Hunter is
exactly the type of federal general common law that Erie forbids.252
At best, Hunter rests on shaky foundations; at worst, it isn’t even
good law.
3. Formal Local Authority over Substantive Policies
Since at least the second half of the 20th century, general-juris-
diction local governments have possessed formal authority over
substantive policy areas.  Such authority is a hallmark of America’s
localist federalism.  Briffault and Schragger have noted that gen-
244. Id. at 33.
245. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928–29 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 404 (Cal. 2008)) (listing the provi-
sions of the California Constitution the plaintiffs claimed that the state violated).
246. Morris, supra note 236, at 33.
247. See id. (explaining that the City Attorney acted pursuant to his role as an
agent of his constituents, not the state).
248. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
249. Id. at 78–79; see also Morris, supra note 236, at 18 (explaining that fed-
eral courts are not empowered to devise law, as state courts do, in the absence of a
federal statute).
250. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
251. Morris, supra note 236, at 18.
252. See id. (“It is difficult to square Hunter’s disregard of state constitutional
designs in favor of a federal general common law rule with the principle an-
nounced in Erie.”).
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eral-jurisdiction local governments can levy property taxes;253 raise
(some) municipal debt;254 determine education finance policy;255
and provide essential services such as sanitation, emergency ser-
vices, and water.256  One of local governments’ most important
powers is authority over land use.  The Supreme Court first recog-
nized a locality’s authority to regulate land use in 1926 in the
landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.257  Since
then, the Court has reaffirmed this power in other influential cases
such as Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas258 and Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.259  According
to Briffault, local governments derive their authority to exercise
such sweeping power from their representative nature of local insti-
tutions.260  As representative political entities, it makes sense to
grant expansive authority to localities, which also makes these lo-
calities fundamentally similar to state and federal government in
ways that administrative agencies are not.  Such expansive local au-
thority clearly indicates that local governments possess a significant
degree of agency and are thus one of the three tiers of American
federalism.
Localities’ control over their own boundaries further demon-
strates the significant extent of local autonomy.  Briffault has noted
that while the federal and state governments redraw congressional
and legislative districts, respectively, on a set schedule, state gov-
ernments generally do not alter localities’ geographical bounda-
ries.261  In fact, state law generally prohibits the state government
from modifying localities’ borders to ensure that local governments
remain responsive to local concerns.262  Local governments’ control
253. See Briffault, supra note 206, at 99 (explaining how most states rely on
the local property taxes to fund schools).
254. SCHRAGGER, supra note 15, at 220 (discussing some of these powers in
the context of state limitations on them).
255. Id.; see also Briffault, supra note 206, at 99.
256. Briffault, supra note 206, at 15.
257. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–89 (1926) (ruling
that land-use ordinances are, on their face, legitimate exercises of the state’s police
power which localities may exercise).
258. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (holding that an ordi-
nance restricting one-family residencies to traditional families fell within the local
government’s authority).
259. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254
(1977) (ruling on whether a locality’s decision to deny a rezoning request was
driven by racially discriminatory intent).
260. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 417 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Localism Part II].
261. Briffault, supra note 206, at 73.
262. Id.
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over their own boundaries means that “local governments are
formed largely in response to local desires.”263  States’ ingrained re-
spect for local structures and geographical boundaries is a recogni-
tion that localities are political entities rather than administrative
units.  As such, state governments have long respected the political
agency local governmental entities exercise on behalf of their re-
sidents.264  Local governments exercise their authority by enacting
substantive policies on behalf of a specific group of people within
defined boundaries.  The agency that local governments exercise is
the same type of agency that the Dole-NFIB framework seeks to
protect.265
Functionally, the federal government recognizes local govern-
ments as independent entities rather than as arms of the state.
Consider the following example.  In Avery v. Midland County,266
the Supreme Court held that the concept of “one man, one vote”
applies to local governments.267  If local governments are simply ad-
ministrative units of the state, rather than representative political
institutions, why would the people have a right to elect their
representatives?268
Further, if local governments are merely instruments of the
states, one expects sovereign immunity to apply to local govern-
ments the same way it applies to state agencies.  Yet, localities do
“not always enjoy the immunities from federal regulation available
to the states, as they would if localities were merely state agen-
cies.”269  In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,270
the Court determined that the exemption from federal antitrust
laws that the states receive under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ac-
cording to Parker v. Brown,271 does not automatically extend to lo-
cal governments.272  By refusing to automatically apply preemption
263. Id.
264. See id. (describing how local boundaries are infrequently modified once
they are drawn, and if they are modified at all, it is the result of a local decision).
265. See supra Part II.A.
266. Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
267. Id. at 481, 488; see also Briffault, supra note 206, at 87–88.
268. See Briffault, supra note 206, at 88 (“If the county government were sim-
ply a state agency, and the state saw the county’s function as the protection of rural
interests, the state reasonably could have sought a rural-oriented county
structure.”).
269. Id. at 91; see also Hills, supra note 223, at 1210 (describing how the Su-
preme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect localities
from lawsuits because the Eleventh Amendment only grants immunity to the
states, not their subparts).
270. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
271. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943).
272. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52–56; see also Briffault, supra note 206, at 91–93.
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to local governments, the Court treated local governments as au-
tonomous governments apart from the state.273
Importantly, the Court in Boulder also determined that Home
Rule does not shield municipalities from antitrust liability under
federal law.274  In determining whether state sovereign immunity
applied to the local government, the Boulder Court applied the
two-pronged test from Parker.275  In doing so, the Court function-
ally recognized a clear distinction between state power and local
power, thus making local government fundamentally different from
state agencies.276
Finally, federal preemption of state power and local power in-
dicates that local governments are distinct political entities.  Con-
sider just two examples:  the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA)277 and the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA).278  Under the
INA, “it is unlawful for a person or entity . . . to hire, or to recruit
or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien
knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.”279  Subsection h(2)
states “[t]he provisions of this section preempt any State or local
law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licens-
ing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for
a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”280  The ADA prohibits
any “State or political subdivision thereof” from implementing laws
which relate to scheduling or pricing rates of “interstate or intra-
state transportation provided by a motor carrier . . . on an interstate
route.”281  Noticeably, both laws specifically preempt states and
their political subdivisions from regulating these issues.282  If local
governments are just instrumentalities of the state, such wording
273. Briffault, supra note 206, at 92.
274. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52–57 (rejecting the respondents’ argument that
their Home-Rule amendment is a “state action” and thereby meets one of the
required criterion of Parker); see also Briffault, supra note 206, at 92–94 (explain-
ing what the Court did in Boulder and the impact of that ruling on the agency of
localities).
275. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52–54; see Briffault, supra note 206, at 93 (laying out
the two prongs of the Parker test).
276. See Briffault, supra note 206, at 93 (“The Boulder Court properly treated
home rule as a statement of the municipality’s relative autonomy from state super-
vision and of the state’s neutrality concerning municipal decision making, rather
than as an affirmative authorization of local anticompetitive actions.”).
277. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
278. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2018).
280. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (emphasis added).
281. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1)(A) (2018).
282. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2); 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1).
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would be superfluous.  By including explicit references to state gov-
ernments and their political subdivisions, Congress implicitly recog-
nized local governments as a separate tier of federalism.
4. Counterpoints and Response
Admittedly, states have retained significant limitations on local
governments.  For example, many states regulate the types of taxes
local governments can levy, the rates at which they can levy taxes,
and how much debt localities may raise in a fiscal year.283  Such
limitations seem inconsistent with the notion of local governments
as political, representative governments exercising agency on behalf
of their constituents.
Moreover, unlike states in the early 20th century, states in the
21st century have made significant moves to win back local power.
Over the last two decades, dozens of states have preempted local
authority over a variety of controversial public policies—such as
right-to-work laws, the minimum wage, and employment discrimi-
nation.284  By July 2017, at least 25 states enacted laws preempting
local governments from setting minimum-wage regulations on pri-
vate employers.285  Fourteen of these states passed such laws be-
tween 2011 and 2017.286  Over that same period, 17 states ratified
preemption laws governing employment benefits offered by private
employers,287 and six established right-to-work laws.288  During the
2000s, states also targeted local governments’ authority over hous-
ing.  Since 2001, for example, eight states have preempted local
rent-control ordinances,289 and five have preempted inclusionary
zoning ordinances.290
283. See SCHRAGGER, supra note 15, at 220.
284. See supra notes 253–56.
285. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, FIGHTING PREEMPTION: THE MOVEMENT
FOR HIGHER WAGES MUST OPPOSE STATE EFFORTS TO BLOCK LOCAL MINIMUM
WAGE LAWS 2 (2017), http://bit.ly/2GycTjc [https://perma.cc/P78M-VPTC].
286. Id. at 5 n.12.
287. NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A
STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 3, 8–9 (2017), http://bit.ly/2GnsEJL [https://perma.cc/
JA2M-J6P6].
288. Right-to-Work Resources, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://bit.ly/
2R5TN8a [http://bit.ly/2R5TN8a] (listing Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri,
Wisconsin, and West Virginia as the six states who passed right-to-work laws be-
tween 2011 and 2017).
289. Rent Control Laws by State, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUSING COUNCIL
(Aug. 29, 2018), http://bit.ly/2R2NcLR [https://perma.cc/Q2LL-9JLE].
290. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 287, at 23.
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Although many states have restricted local authority over some
issues over the last two decades,291 local governments still possess
significant formal legal authority and remain representative govern-
mental entities.  This Article does not argue that local governments
are equal to their state governments.  Local governments are unde-
niably subordinate to their state governments, just as state govern-
ments are subordinate to the federal government in certain areas
and vice versa.  This Article demonstrates how local governments
exercise agency in the same manner as political entities, like states.
Local governments are mini-sovereigns,292 and as such, they have
the authority to act on behalf of their constituents, independent of
the states.  Local governments possess formal authorities over vari-
ous political issues and exercise agency to enact policies; they are
the third-tier of American federalism.  As the third-tier of Ameri-
can federalism, local governments, just like state governments,
command the respect of the Spending Clause.
III. RECONCILING LOCALIST FEDERALISM AND THE
CONDITIONAL SPENDING POWER
EO 13768 has put local governments and the federal govern-
ment on a collision course over the Spending Clause.  To faithfully
apply the Spending Clause, the courts must recognize the role local
governments play in American federalism.  This Article provides
two models that the courts can apply in such situations to ensure
that the Spending Clause is applied appropriately to local govern-
ments:  the Decision-Maker Model and the Localized Expenditure
Model.  The Decision-Maker Model is predicated on the concept of
localist federalism, while the Localized Expenditure Model tracks
the traditional view of federalism.  Despite their fundamentally dif-
ferent foundations, both models reach the same result—the preser-
vation of federalism—because they recognize local governments’
entrenched political agency.
It was important that this Article provide two models for
courts to use.  Because the Spending Clause cannot undermine fed-
eralism, this Article needed to account for both the localist and the
traditional conceptions of American federalism.  Thus, the two
models proposed by this Article appeal to the two factions in the
debate over federalism:  those who believe that localism is im-
291. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITH-
OUT BUILDING WALLS 17 (1999); Nestor M. Davidson, Leaps and Bounds, 108
MICH. L. REV. 957, 959 (2010) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON,
CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008)).
292. SCHRAGGER, supra note 15, at 81.
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printed in American federalism and those who do not.  Regardless
of which model is applied, both are superior to the Hunter
Model,293 which subverts local government autonomy and under-
mines the purpose of the Spending Clause’s restrictions:  the preser-
vation of federalism.
A. The Decision-Maker Model
1. Thesis
Under the Decision-Maker Model, courts must apply the Dole-
NFIB framework to either the state government or the government
of the locality that will receive the federal funding, based on which
entity has the authority to accept the funds.  Under this model, the
court will apply a two-step process when considering Spending
Clause challenges.  First, the court will determine which entity has
the authority to accept the federal government’s financial induce-
ment.  This entity is the “decision-maker.”  Once the court has de-
termined who the decision-maker is, the court will then apply the
Dole-NFIB framework.
The Constitution limits the conditional spending power to pre-
vent the federal government from coercing the states by con-
straining their ability to freely and fairly choose whether to receive
federal funds and to follow the attached conditions.294  However,
every state, either through Home-Rule delegations or specific dele-
gations under Dillon’s Rule, has empowered localities to accept va-
rious types of federal grants directly.295  Throughout the country,
states have empowered tens of thousands of local governments to,
most simply put, govern.  Considering this nation’s long-standing
and robust history of localist federalism,296 the courts must apply
the Dole-NFIB framework to localities when they are empowered
to accept or reject federal funds.  Accordingly, when the federal
government bargains directly with local governments that have the
authority to accept an offer by the federal government—as with the
federal funds implicated by EO 13768—the courts must determine
whether the Dole-NFIB framework has been followed with respect
to the local government.
However, if the state government decides whether to accept
federal funds, either on a statewide basis or on behalf of specific
localities, then the state is the proper subject of the Spending
293. See supra Part II.B.2 (outlining the parameters of the Hunter Model and
recalling its roots).
294. See supra Part I.B.
295. See supra Part II.B.1.
296. See supra Part II.B.
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Clause analysis.  With respect to the Medicaid expansion, for exam-
ple, the state governments, not local governments, were the actual
decision-makers.  The states, not local governments, had the au-
thority to accept or reject the funds and would have been held re-
sponsible for failing to comply with Congress’s conditions.  Thus,
their agency had to be protected from federal coercion.  Therefore,
in this instance, it was logical for the Court to apply the Dole-NFIB
framework to the state.  Doing so was consistent with the Court’s
emphasis on considering the perspective of the officials tasked with
accepting or rejecting federal funds, as highlighted in Arlington
School District.297  The Decision-Maker Model respects long-stand-
ing notions of localist federalism while respecting the primacy of
the states’ localized expenditure over their respective local govern-
ments.  In doing so, it ensures that the Spending Clause respects
federalism as it exists.
Some scholars seem to agree with the logic behind the Deci-
sion-Maker Model.  Professors Vikram Amar and Michael Schaps,
for example, have evaluated the validity of EO 13768 as applied to
San Francisco, arguing that the Dole-NFIB framework should be
applied to San Francisco directly.298  They did so because the
“Spending-Clause doctrine in NFIB . . . [is] consciously designed to
preserve some meaningful choice by states/localities about whether
or not to accept conditional federal funds.”299  Thus, Amar and
Schaps applied the Dole-NFIB framework to San Francisco for the
same reason this Article sets forth the Decision-Maker Model:  to
preserve the decision-maker’s agency.
Professor Ilya Somin may also agree with the Decision-Maker
Model.  Somin posits that the clear-conditions prong of the Dole-
NFIB framework applies to grants offered to “states and locali-
ties.”300  According to Somin, EO 13768 violates the clear-condi-
tions prong because “[f]ew if any federal grants to sanctuary cities
297. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296
(2006) (“Thus, in the present case, we must view the [federal funds] from the per-
spective of a state official who is engaged in the process of deciding whether the
State should accept [those] funds . . . .”); see also supra notes 170–73 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the relevance of the Arlington School District decision in the
Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence).
298. Vikram David Amar & Michael Schaps, How Strong Is San Francisco’s
“Sanctuary City” Lawsuit Against the Trump Administration?, VERDICT (Feb. 10,
2017), http://bit.ly/2GoQOnc [https://perma.cc/QW74-V4AS].
299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. Ilya Somin, Why Trump’s Executive Order on Sanctuary Cities Is Uncon-
stitutional, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://wapo.st/2R5G6GE [https://
perma.cc/J4GV-26HW] (emphasis added).
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are explicitly conditioned on compliance with Section 1373.”301
Rather than apply the clear-conditions element to the states, Somin
believes it must be applied directly to the sanctuary cities302—which
is exactly what a court would do when applying the Decision-Maker
Model.
To some extent, Hills’s work is also consistent with the Deci-
sion-Maker Model.  For example, Hills has noted that “when Con-
gress specifies localities as the recipients of federal money, they
really mean localities and not the state generally.”303  Hills has also
argued that a local government’s acceptance of federal funds may
not be considered a proxy for its state’s acceptance of those funds,
and vice versa.304  These arguments are completely consistent with
the Decision-Maker Model.305
Spencer Amdur, a staff attorney with the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, agrees that it is unclear how the Dole-NFIB frame-
work applies to local governments or whose budget the Court must
evaluate to determine coercion.306  Amdur also recognizes that the
answers to these questions likely depend on the “answers to some
deeper questions about local government’s role in federalism.”307
Yet, Amdur argues that the Dole-NFIB framework likely protects
local governments.308  The Decision-Maker Model is based on the
answers to these “deeper questions” about local government, and
protects local governments’ role in American federalism.
2. Criticism
Nevertheless, several legal scholars completely disagree with
the Decision-Maker Model.  Professor Noah Feldman believes that
the Spending Clause cannot be applied to localities given the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Hunter v. Pittsburgh.309  Hans von Spakov-
301. Id.
302. Id.  An open letter signed by 292 law professors and scholars, including
Professors Gerald Frug, Laurence Tribe, Jamal Greene, and Erwin Chemerinsky,
made a similar argument. See Letter from 292 Law Professors and Scholars to
President Donald J. Trump (Mar. 13, 2017), http://bit.ly/2R5ZMd8 [https://
perma.cc/RDD3-4YSB].
303. Hills, supra note 223, at 1244.
304. Id. at 1247 (“The power of the federal government to preempt state laws
under the Supremacy Clause depends on the state’s voluntary acceptance of fed-
eral money, and Connecticut had never accepted any federal grant.”).
305. See supra Part III.A (describing the goals of the Decision-Maker Model).
306. Amdur, supra note 9, at 142–45.  In this thoughtful article, Amdur dis-
cusses the intersection of immigration law and the Spending Clause.
307. Id. at 147.
308. Id.
309. See supra Part II.B (describing the views of Feldman and the pitfalls of
those views).
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sky of the Heritage Foundation is also a proponent of the Hunter
Model.310  In addressing the coercion prong of the Spending Clause
analysis in regard to EO 13768, Spakovsky argues that states can
decide whether to apply for grants from the DOJ for local law en-
forcement.311  Therefore, states, not localities are the subject of the
Dole-NFIB framework because “[w]hat’s at stake are discretionary
grants that the states may or may not decide to apply for, and which
the [DOJ] may or may not choose to grant.”312
Professor Eloise Pasachoff, an expert on the conditional spend-
ing power, is also skeptical of the logic of the Decision-Maker
Model.  Pasachoff has pointed out that “[i]t is perfectly consistent
to be concerned about the federal government coercing the states
and not worried about the federal government coercing local school
districts, because local school districts answer to the states through
whose coffers most federal education money flows.”313
In fact, Pasachoff seems to argue that the Joint Opinion in
NFIB relies on the traditional, bifurcated conception of American
federalism.314  She believes that federal coercion of local school dis-
tricts is “something of a sideshow” because
the rationales offered in NFIB for finding coercion were strongly
rooted in the idea that the states are sovereign entities with inde-
pendent constitutional rights under the Tenth Amendment.  The
concerns about commandeering, “our system of federalism,” “in-
vading the states’ jurisdiction,” “the unique role of the States in
our system,” respect for “the legislative processes of the
States,”the accountability of state officials, the dangers of “co-
opting the States’ political processes,” “the practical ability of
States to collect their own taxes,” and so on were crucial to the
articulation of the justification for a robust coercion inquiry.
These concerns simply do not have the same traction with enti-
ties other than the states, whose existence is not part of the core
constitutional compact on which the country’s existence
depends.315
310. Hans A. von Spakovsky, Sanctuary Cities? That’s a Constitutional ‘Hell
No’, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 18, 2017), https://herit.ag/2GmwG5q [https://
perma.cc/E5LH-URUS].
311. Id.
312. Id. (emphasis added).
313. Pasachoff, supra note 158, at 653.
314. Id. at 652–53 (“These concerns simply do not have the same traction with
entities other than the states, whose existence is not part of the core constitutional
compact on which the country’s existence depends.”).
315. Id.
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However, Pasachoff’s point misses the mark.  Local govern-
ments are mini-sovereigns.316  Communities elect their local gov-
ernment officials through elections that require one man, one
vote.317  Local governments govern land use in their jurisdictions;
they provide sanitation and emergency services; they subsidize busi-
nesses; and they develop public spaces.318  To carry out these ac-
tions, local governments raise revenue, implement laws, and
enforce ordinances.319  The concerns raised in NFIB to which
Pasachoff refers touch on each of these local government activities
and also to the political nature of local government itself.  These
concerns are as equally relevant to local governments as they are to
state governments.320
Pasachoff justifies her view by relying on the fact that the
states’ existence is “part of the core constitutional compact on
which the country’s existence depends.”321  That is completely true;
there is no federalism without the states.  Yet, it misunderstands the
nature of American federalism, “on which the country’s existence
depends.”322  Localist federalism is the enduring form of federalism
in the United States.323  Local government need not be equal to the
states to be the third-tier of the American federalist system.  Be-
cause local governments are the third-tier, the concerns underlying
316. See supra Part II; Briffault, supra note 206, at 87–90; SCHRAGGER, supra
note 15, at 81.
317. See Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968) (holding that the
principle of “one man, one vote” applies to local governments); see also supra
notes 266–68 and accompanying text.
318. Briffault, supra note 206, at 19 n.59.
319. Id. at 19.
320. See supra Part II (detailing the similarities between the state govern-
ment’s relationship with constituents and local government’s relationship with
constituents).
321. See Pasachoff, supra note 158, at 653.
322. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist shared this sentiment:
Both [the Tenth and Eleventh] Amendments are simply examples of the
understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the
States were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative
authority could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Con-
gress was competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal
with a State as if it were just another individual or business enterprise
subject to regulation.
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975).  Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed
federalism as the foundation of the Constitution, arguing that “[s]urely there can
be no more fundamental constitutional question than that of the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution as to how authority should be allocated between the
National and State Governments.” Id. at 559.
323. See supra notes 253–60 and accompanying text (discussing the shift in
American federalism over the past decade).
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the Dole-NFIB framework are present in full force when the fed-
eral government bargains with local governments.
However, Pasachoff is not necessarily convinced that the
courts should determine coercion by analyzing state budgets when
localized funding is in question: “When the question is whether
school districts are being coerced, it is much less clear whose budget
is the proper denominator.  Is it the school district’s own budget?
The budget of the jurisdiction in which the school district sits?  The
state budget?”324  Pasachoff’s skepticism demonstrates that the
logic of the Hunter Model does not sit too easily upon examination,
even among its supporters.
B. The Localized Expenditure Model
1. Thesis
In contrast to the Decision-Maker Model, the Localized Ex-
penditure Model is rooted in the traditional notion of American
federalism.  Like the Hunter Model, the Localized Expenditure
Model accepts the “common” view that localities are the instru-
mentalities of their states.  As such, localities are completely
subordinate to the state government, despite their democratic na-
ture.  However, the Localized Expenditure Model takes a more
nuanced view of federalism than the Hunter Model does, resulting
in an application of the Spending Clause that is functionally identi-
cal to the Decision-Maker Model.
The Localized Expenditure Model is founded upon two key
points.  First, many federal grants are contracts between the federal
government and a specific local government, rather than between
the federal government and a state government.325  While state gov-
ernments can prevent their localities from directly contracting with
the federal government by outrightly prohibiting such action, by re-
quiring state approval, or by enacting some other type of control
mechanism, they often do not.  Thus, localities themselves often ac-
cept federal funds subject to conditions.326  Second, federal-to-local
grants supplement states’ budget allocations to their local govern-
ments.  More specifically, a federal grant given to a specific locality
supplements the revenue that the state normally would distribute to
that particular locality.  State governments allocate some of the to-
324. See Pasachoff, supra note 158, at 654.
325. See supra notes 186–91 (discussing how the Joint Opinion and the Joint
Dissent in NFIB emphasized the principles of contract law in relation to Con-
gress’s conditional spending power).
326. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
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tal statewide revenue to fund local governments.327  Some states list
the dollar amount to be distributed to each local government as a
specific item in the budget,328 whereas others designate funds to lo-
cal government more generally.329  Regardless of how a state dis-
tributes its funds, each state’s budget sets aside an amount of funds
that each locality will receive for the fiscal year.330  Because the
state sets the amount of revenue it will distribute to its localities,
and localities often bargain directly with the federal government for
supplemental funds, any loss of bargained-for federal funds will
present the state with an unsavory choice:  replace the specific lo-
cality’s lost funds or allow that locality to operate with a smaller-
than-expected budget.
These premises lead to an important nuance that the Hunter
Model misses:  funds for specific localities are at stake when the
federal government takes action upon localities, like in EO 13768.
When a state sets its budget, it decides how much money to allocate
to local governments.  In so doing, the state decides how much fi-
nancial support to give each locality.  Thus, conditional spending by
the federal government forces states to choose between expending
additional state funds to recapitalize specific localities or allowing
specific localities to be underfunded relative to initial expectations.
To capture this nuance, the Localized Expenditure Model applies
the Dole-NFIB framework to the locality’s budget that would be
affected by the acceptance or rejection of federal funds because
that is the budget the state is being pressured to recapitalize.
Consider a hypothetical.  If the city of San Francisco loses fed-
eral funds because of EO 13768, San Francisco’s budget would be
smaller than the state of California originally anticipated.  In that
event, California would have to decide whether to recapitalize San
Francisco.  Such a decision creates obvious political pressure for the
state, a key concern discussed in the Joint Opinion in NFIB.331  To
determine whether the actions of the federal government place un-
327. See State and Local Expenditures, URBAN INST., https://urbn.is/2R23uog
[https://perma.cc/W3U2-J9CM] (explaining how localities use funds from the state
to administer certain programs).
328. See, e.g., OHIO DEP’T OF TAXATION, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 142–44
(2009), http://bit.ly/2R3t10i [https://perma.cc/HM5B-VFP3]; COMMONWEALTH OF
VA., 2016–2018 BIENNIAL BUDGET AND AMENDMENTS TO THE 2015 APPROPRIA-
TION ACT, at C-3 to C-10 (2015), http://bit.ly/2R5StT0 [https://perma.cc/A7BK-
9Y8P].
329. See, e.g., S.B. 848, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018).
330. See supra notes 327–29.
331. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012) (clari-
fying that the Court has used its Spending Clause analysis to ensure that the fed-
eral government was not unduly influencing the states).
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due pressure on the state to recapitalize San Francisco, the Local-
ized Expenditure Model would apply the Dole-NFIB framework to
San Francisco’s budget because that is the segment of the state’s
budget being squeezed by the federal government.  Accordingly,
under the Localized Expenditure Model, when the court applies the
coercion prong of the Dole-NFIB framework, it would also deter-
mine what percentage of San Francisco’s budget the federal funds
constitute.
By using the targeted locality’s budget as the relevant baseline,
the Localized Expenditure Model focuses on the impact that the
federal government’s conditional spending has on the targeted lo-
cality while preserving the supremacy of the states over their locali-
ties.  Moreover, by recognizing that the pressure that conditional
federal spending applies in such cases effects both the localities and
the state governments, this model provides a method by which the
courts can account for both pressures.  Accounting for both pres-
sures is essential to ensure that the Spending Clause does not com-
promise federalism by allowing the federal government to coerce
state action.
2. Criticism
One potentially significant criticism of the Localized Expendi-
ture Model is that it uses the wrong budget.  If, as this model ar-
gues, a state is indirectly pressured to recapitalize one or more of its
localities due to lost revenues from federal grant programs, then, as
critics may argue, the proper measure of coercion is the percentage
of the state’s revenues that the supplemental funds would consti-
tute.  In NFIB, the states would have been forced to replace all of
the federal funding for Medicaid.332  The Court found the
threatened withdrawal of Medicaid funds to be coercive because
the funds to be replaced constituted more than ten percent of the
various states’ individual budgets.333  The same logic applies to
sanctuary cities.334  If the federal government withdraws funds for
law enforcement from San Francisco, the state of California may
have to replace those funds.  Thus, some may argue that the funds
available to the state are the proper baseline to determine the coer-
cive effect of the federal government’s action.
Alternatively, a critic may argue that the courts should mea-
sure the replacement funds against the specific state’s budget ex-
332. Id. at 583–85.
333. Id. at 582.
334. See supra Part I.A.
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penditures for local government in general.  States set aside funds
for various purposes, including funding localities.  Therefore, a state
determines its optimal expenditure on local government in its
budget.  By measuring the replacement funds as a percentage of the
funds a state wanted to spend, per its budget, on local government,
the court can measure how coercive the federal government’s
threat is to the state’s preference for local government financing.
Critics may argue that either of these measures would be more ac-
curate accounts of the coercive effect of the federal government’s
withdrawal of grants to localities than the measure proposed by the
Localized Expenditure Model.
The first argument ignores the crucial fact that the harm, and
thus the pressure, is concentrated in specific localities while the sec-
ond argument misses the fact that not all localities will be affected
by actions like EO 13768.335  Consider the San Francisco example
again.  If San Francisco loses one billion dollars, as it believes it will,
due to EO 13768, its budget will be 13 percent lower than it would
be otherwise.336  One billion dollars is, however, only one percent
of California’s budget.337  The funds California would have to re-
place are not for a statewide program nor are the harms felt across
the state.  Rather, the funds, and the harm caused by their with-
drawal, are concentrated in San Francisco.  Thus, measuring the
harm relative to San Francisco’s budget more accurately captures
the amount of pressure California’s state government will face
when threatened with having to decide whether to replace San
Francisco’s lost funds.  By measuring the federal revenues at stake
relative to the targeted locality’s budget, the Localized Expenditure
Model more accurately measures the amount of coercion that the
federal government’s conditional spending impresses upon the rele-
vant state.
The concentration of harm in one locality in this example also
highlights how the critic’s approach is inferior to the Localized Ex-
penditure Model.  Here, only San Francisco’s budget is reduced; the
budgets of the other California local governments would not
change.  If the courts evaluated coercion by measuring the funds
335. EO 13768 purports to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a provision with which the
Administration believes sanctuary jurisdictions, and only sanctuary jurisdictions,
do not comply.
336. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir.
2018) (describing how federal funds make up $1.2 billion of San Francisco’s yearly
budget of $9.6 billion).
337. See CAL. STATE BUDGET 18 (2018), http://bit.ly/2Gv0cFZ [https://
perma.cc/D9ME-ERT9] (listing the total resources available for FY 2018–2019 as
approximately $141 billion).
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withdrawn from that one local government as a percentage of the
total amount of money the California state government distributed
to all local governments, then the court would underappreciate the
coercive effect of the federal government’s threat.  All of the
threatened harm would be concentrated in San Francisco.338  Cali-
fornia allocated a certain sum of money to San Francisco based on
what California thought was optimal.  If San Francisco loses federal
dollars, California would have to decide whether to recapitalize San
Francisco to that optimal level.  The amount of money California
allocated to other localities is immaterial since California does not
need to recapitalize any other city.  The federal government’s
threat, then, only applies in the context of California’s optimal ex-
penditures on San Francisco.
For clarity, it is worth noting that the Localized Expenditure
Model does not ignore the fact that localities like San Francisco
have their own budgets, which are partially funded by taxes and
fees they levy and debt they raise.339  That fact is not relevant, how-
ever, since the model recognizes that localities are instruments of
the states that receive significant state funding.  The model views
localities’ budgets as relevant because of the effect those budgets’
have on the state budget as a whole, not because localities are polit-
ical entities.  In disregarding localities’ political nature, the model
implicitly accepts the traditional notion of federalism.  Accordingly,
when the federal government threatens to withhold funds from lo-
calities, it pressures the state government to make a difficult choice
about its finances and the financial health of specific localities.
Although the Localized Expenditure Model adheres to the
traditional notion of American federalism, it preserves local and
state autonomy through the Spending Clause by using the most ap-
propriate measure of coercion:  the loss of federal dollars measured
against the budget of the locality that is harmed.  This model ad-
heres to traditional American federalism by acknowledging that the
state will have to decide whether to restore the locality’s budget
and thus recognizing that it is the state who will feel the effects of
338. See San Francisco I, 897 F.3d at 1237–38 (referencing the Attorney Gen-
eral’s op-ed that specifically called out San Francisco as one of the targeted sanctu-
ary cities).
339. See, e.g., CITY & CTY. OF S.F., MAYOR’S 2017-2018 & 2018-2019 PRO-
POSED BUDGET (2012) http://bit.ly/2GqUWTL [https://perma.cc/YBK3-N9E9].  It
is well documented by Professor Schragger and others that local power to raise
taxes and debts is limited.  These limitations draw the states into the conditional
spending fights between the federal government and localities since state funds
will—and likely, must—replace the withheld federal funds if those funds are to be
replaced.
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the federal government’s action.  In so doing, the Localized Expen-
diture Model, unlike the Hunter Model, precludes the federal gov-
ernment from subverting local governments’ political agency.
IV. IMPORTANCE
A. Preservation of (Actual) Federalism
The purpose of the conditional spending power doctrine is to
safeguard federalism.340  Courts can only do this by applying the
Decision-Maker Model or the Localized Expenditure Model.341
Applying the Hunter Model, on the other hand, would not protect
local governments—the third-tier of American federalism—be-
cause almost no federal inducement to a locality would be found
coercive, despite the effect the inducement has on the locality that
the federal government is actually soliciting.342
Consider San Francisco one last time.  The city fears that EO
13768, if enforced as written, would rescind 13 percent of its
budget.343  If courts apply the Decision-Maker or the Localized Ex-
penditure models, they will likely rule that EO 13768 is coercive
because a budget cut of 13 percent is higher than the ten percent
cut the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in NFIB.344  Under
the Hunter Model, however, the lost funds would be measured
against California’s budget.345  Relative to California’s budget, $1.2
billion is a loss of only one percent.346  Per the Hunter Model, the
court would likely find that a one percent cut is not coercive.347
340. See supra Part I.B.
341. See supra Part III.A.2.
342. See supra Part II.B.1–2.
343. See San Francisco I, 897 F.3d at 1235 (describing the amount of federal
funds in San Francisco’s yearly budget).
344. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–85 (2012)
(finding the Medicaid expansion provision amounted to undue coercion on the
state because it would rescind ten percent of the state’s budget).
345. See von Spakovsky, supra note 310 (“What’s at stake are discretionary
grants that the states may or may not decide to apply for, and which the Justice
Department may or may not choose to grant.”) (emphasis added).
346. See CAL. STATE BUDGET, supra note 337, at 18 (listing $141 billion as the
total amount of resources California has for FY 2018–2019).
347. In Dole, the Court determined that the federal government did not co-
erce the state by threatening to withdraw five percent of the funds available to the
state for highway construction and maintenance.  South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d
628, 632 (1986).  In contrast, the Court in Sebelius held that the federal govern-
ment did coerce the states by threatening to withdraw all of the states’ Medicaid
funding, which amounted to ten percent of their budgets. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 582.
It is highly doubtful that the Court would determine that the federal government
compelled San Francisco to abandon its sanctuary city policies by threatening to
withdraw less than one percent of the state’s total budget.
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Under the Hunter Model, the federal government can coerce San
Francisco to adopt immigration-related law-enforcement policies it
would otherwise reject, simply because the state in which it is lo-
cated has a sufficiently large budget.
The Hunter Model, therefore, leads to an absurd result:  the
same grant will be coercive for one city but not for another even if
those cities have equal budgets, simply because one city is in a
richer state than the other.  The federal government, therefore, may
coerce a locality simply because the locality’s state—which was
neither involved in the decision to accept or reject the funds nor a
part of the discussion on how to use them or implement the funds’
conditions—has a sufficiently large revenue stream.  Such an appli-
cation of the Spending Clause would give the federal government
the same power over localities that the Joint Opinion in NFIB re-
fused to grant it over states.348  Irrespective of which model a court
applies, both the Decision-Maker Model and the Localized Expen-
diture Model protect the political agency of localities; the Hunter
Model does not.
Regardless of which model courts apply, the Supreme Court
should provide Congress and the executive branch clarification as
to whom the federal government is actually bargaining with when it
offers financial inducements.  Doing so will minimize the risk that
the courts will need to invalidate acts of Congress.349  In order for
Congress to design financial inducements that are not coercive,
Congress needs to know whom it is seeking to persuade.  With this
knowledge, Congress can determine the optimal amount of finan-
cial inducement and remain fairly confident that the offer will not
be considered coercive.  Without this knowledge, Congress will be
perpetually unsure whether its financial inducement will be consid-
ered coercive.  The current lack of clarity over this issue has already
resulted in significant litigation.350  More will follow if the Supreme
Court does not provide a clear answer.
348. Cf. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 580–85 (describing how allowing the federal gov-
ernment to coerce states into accepting grants of federal funds threatens
federalism).
349. Federal courts widely apply the controversial “canon of constitutional
avoidance” to avoid invalidating federal legislation. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson,
Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV.
L. REV. F. 331, 334–35 (2015).
350. See supra notes 55–86 and accompanying text (describing the recent law-
suits related to EO 13768 and the different responses of various states).
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B. Spatially Polarized Politics
Applying the Dole-NFIB framework directly to localities when
localities bargain with the federal government is also essential in
light of America’s increasingly spatially polarized politics.  Cities
are dominated by members of the Democratic Party while Republi-
cans represent most non-urban districts.351  As of August 2017, 33
of the 50 most populous cities in the United States had Democratic
mayors whereas only 14 of those cities had Republican mayors.352
Of the ten most populous cities in America, only one—San Di-
ego—is led by a Republican; eight of the others are led by Demo-
crats.353  Most non-urban districts and most states, however, align
with the Republican Party.  Of the 3,100 counties in the United
States, 2,600 voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential elec-
tion.354  It is clear that the majority of these counties were non-ur-
ban because Hillary Clinton won 88 of the 100 largest counties in
the election, but only won 500 counties in total.355
As a result of the severity of urban-nonurban political polariza-
tion, the country is divided into red states and blue cities.356  While
Democrats control eight of the ten largest cities, four of those cit-
ies—San Antonio, Dallas, Houston, and Phoenix—are in states
with Republican governors.357  Of the 50 largest cities, 22 are in
351. Robert O’Connor et al., US Local Government and Mayors of Largest
Cities, CITY MAYORS, http://bit.ly/2GAVIOm [https://perma.cc/527P-4QCZ]; see
also Sara Burnett, Election Results Offer More Evidence of Urban-Rural Divide,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 9, 2018), http://bit.ly/2GnbRqi [https://perma.cc/
TL7G-LVQX]; David Montgomery, In These Outlier Congressional Districts, Den-
sity Doesn’t Equal Democrats, CITYLAB (Nov. 1, 2018), http://bit.ly/2R2EJYZ
[https://perma.cc/F6N2-VT33].
352. O’Connor et al., supra note 351 (listing the 50 most populated cities in
the country and the political affiliations of their mayors).
353. Id.  Ron Nirenberg, mayor of San Antonio, was not elected as a candi-
date of any political party because municipal elections in Texas are non-partisan
contests.  Gromer Jeffers, Jr., Taking Cue from Democrats, Texas Republicans
Moving to Influence ‘Nonpartisan’ Elections, DALLAS NEWS (July 2017), http://
bit.ly/2R2FscF [https://perma.cc/46DH-H9FW].
354. See Zeke J. Miller & Chris Wilson, See a Map That Shows Exactly How
Donald Trump Won, TIME (Dec. 1, 2016), http://bit.ly/2GqJOq3 [https://perma.cc/
9NMY-AE2K].
355. David A. Graham, Red State, Blue City, ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2017), http:/
/bit.ly/2Gsrmxo [https://perma.cc/S4FN-CLYR]; Sydney Schaedel, Clinton Coun-
ties, FACTCHECK.ORG (Dec. 9, 2016), https://bit.ly/2ScHkNi [https://perma.cc/
L8MJ-U8MW] (stating Clinton won at least 487 counties in the 2016 election).
356. Graham, supra note 355.
357. See O’Connor et al., supra note 351 (listing the 50 most populated cities
in the country and the political affiliations of their mayors); Current Governors,
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, http://bit.ly/2GpPfpa [https://perma.cc/AV2V-6CTG]
(providing a database of the current governors of the 50 U.S. states).
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Republican-controlled states.358  Overall, Republicans govern 27
states.359
This stark geographic political divide creates an adversarial
federal-local government dynamic that is also divided along party
lines.  The conditional spending power has been and will continue
to be a potent weapon for federal officials of one party to restrict
the policy preferences of local officials of the other party.  Sanctu-
ary cities are a case-in-point.  EO 13768 and the various sanctuary-
cities bills attempt to use federal funds to alter localities’ immigra-
tion-related policies.360  It is no surprise these policies will, if imple-
mented, disproportionately penalize Democratic cities.
When the Democratic Party regains control of the White
House and Congress, it may seek to pressure suburban and rural
localities through the Spending Clause as well.  For example, future
Democratic presidents and congressional majorities may tie various
federal funds to the adoption of more stringent firearm policies.361
Alternatively, Democratic representatives and presidents may add
new conditions to community-development grants requiring locali-
ties to promote integrated communities or increase the affordable
housing stock.362  Many suburban and rural communities would
358. See O’Connor et al., supra note 351; Current Governors, NAT’L GOVER-
NORS ASS’N, supra note 357.
359. See Governors, REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASS’N, http://bit.ly/2R3wrA5
[https://perma.cc/AJV7-CNJ3] (providing a database of the 27 Republican
governors).
360. See EO 13768, supra note 2, at 8799 (“Ensure that jurisdictions that fail
to comply with applicable Federal law do not received Federal funds, except as
mandated by law . . . .”).
361. Over the last few years, Democrats have voiced strong support for tight-
ening gun control measures. See James Arkin, Democrats Push for Gun Control as
a Campaign Issue, REALCLEAR POL. (Feb. 20, 2018), http://bit.ly/2R2xErw [https://
perma.cc/F583-U9YD]; see also Sara Shayanian, House Democrats Pushing Gun
Control After Las Vegas Mass Shooting, UPI (Oct. 4, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Ra2dvg
[https://perma.cc/NH8S-QRF7]; Richard Cowan, Senate Democrats Push for New
Gun Control Measures, REUTERS (June 13, 2016), https://reut.rs/2R35BYT [https://
perma.cc/DA5Y-DM3E].  Democrats also blocked from the 2018 omnibus budget
bills a provision that would have allowed public schools to purchase firearms with
federal funds. See Perry Bacon, Jr., Gun Policy Is Already Changing in the Wake
of Parkland, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 29, 2018), https://53eig.ht/2R2zb0K [https://
perma.cc/F3GL-H344].
362. These are important policies to the Democratic Party. See Press Release,
U.S. House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Waters Introduces Bill to Restore Fair Housing
Protections Eliminated by Secretary Carson (June 26, 2018), http://bit.ly/
2GBOE42 [https://perma.cc/FE8C-CBX6] (“The Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD) is supposed to create strong communities; expand access
to affordable housing; and enforce fair housing rights.”); see also Althea Arnold,
Senate Democrats Unveil Infrastructure Plan with Support for Affordable Housing,
NAT’L COUNCIL ST. HOUSING AGENCIES (Mar. 9, 2018), http://bit.ly/2GrDU87
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likely oppose such conditions, just as cities like Chicago and San
Francisco oppose the Trump Administration’s immigration-related
conditions.363  A clear judicial determination of the application of
the Dole-NFIB framework to local governments is essential to ad-
dress the current federal-local showdown over sanctuary cities, and
for the federal-local battlegrounds to come.
CONCLUSION
In 2012, the Court demonstrated its willingness to use the
Spending Clause to invalidate federal grant programs to the states.
In NFIB, the Court reaffirmed the foundations of its Spending
Clause jurisprudence, revamped its earlier views on coercion, and
incorporated new concerns into the Spending Clause analysis.  In
NFIB, the Court cemented its view of how courts can preserve fed-
eralism, considering the number of negotiations that occur directly
between the federal and state governments.  The Court’s decision,
unsurprisingly, sparked significant debate among the public and the
legal community, resulting in numerous articles examining a variety
of the decision’s aspects.  The Court and most scholars, however,
have not addressed what has become and what will continue to be a
core concern of the Spending Clause:  how does the Spending
Clause apply to federal-local financial bargains?
EO 13768 has brought this fundamental question to the fore-
front of constitutional law.  The implications of this executive order
and the way the Court applies the Dole-NFIB framework to evalu-
ate EO 13768’s application are massive; billions of dollars are at
stake, and the political fights are protracted.  At the heart of the
Court’s Dole-NFIB framework is political agency.  The framework
prevents the federal government from coercing the states into im-
plementing its policy preferences, thus compromising federalism by
ensuring that the states’ political agency is maintained during and
after the bargaining process.  To date, this framework has over-
looked the political agency of local governments, which has been
engrained in American federalism for decades.
Local governments are not mere administrative agencies of
their states; they are representative political entities that exercise
police powers on behalf of their geographically defined constituen-
[https://perma.cc/86L7-F6Z3] (highlighting Senate Democrats’ proposal for provid-
ing federal funding to localities for affordable housing).
363. Peter Whoriskey, Space for Employers, Not for Homes, WASH. POST
(Aug. 8, 2004), https://wapo.st/2R3DUzj [https://perma.cc/TNH6-CMS8]; Ana Bea-
triz Cholo, Why Affordable Housing Doesn’t Get Built, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb.
25, 2016), http://bit.ly/2R4bsgt [https://perma.cc/E42T-5XQB].
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cies.  They are “mini-sovereigns” and have been viewed as such by
state governments, the federal government, and the courts in a vari-
ety of contexts for many years.  The reality is that American feder-
alism has three tiers:  federal, state, and local.  Accordingly, federal
inducements negotiated by and given directly to local governments
raise the same federalism concerns advanced by the Court in its
Spending Clause cases.  The Dole-NFIB framework needs to be ap-
plied to such inducements directly, just as it is when the federal
governments bargains with the state at-large.
It is not necessary to believe that local governments are the
third-tier of federalism, however, to believe that the Dole-NFIB
framework needs to be applied in the same manner.  While the
traditional notion of American federalism is as a two-tiered struc-
ture, meaningful localism has been an accepted component of state
government for at least a century.  State governments promote lo-
cal governments within their territories by allocating funds for them
from statewide revenues.  These funds represent the state govern-
ment’s preferred level of statewide spending on local government in
general, but also the state’s preferred level of financial support for
specific localities.  When the federal government threatens to with-
hold funds from specific localities, its threat has two effects.  First,
the threat saddles the localities’ state with a difficult choice:  recapi-
talize specific localities or allow those localities to operate with
suboptimal funding.  Second, it threatens a specific jurisdiction
within the state, rather than the state as a whole.  Thus, the coer-
cion that the Dole-NFIB framework is designed to invalidate is con-
centrated on specific localities rather than the state as a whole; the
state is pressured to make financial decisions about specific locali-
ties, and those localities, not others, bear the cost of the state’s deci-
sion.  Accordingly, the most accurate measure of the federal
government’s targeted coercion is the targeted locality’s budget, not
the state’s total budget.
To properly apply the Spending Clause to federal-local grant
programs, the courts should adopt either the Decision-Maker
Model or the Localized Expenditure Model.  The Decision-Maker
Model is based on a localist view of federalism, recognizing that
local governments are, in many contexts, “mini-sovereigns.”  Ac-
cordingly, this model directs the courts to apply the Dole-NFIB
framework to localities in the same manner it would to states in
cases where the local government is empowered to make the final
decision over whether to accept federal funds.  The Localized Ex-
penditure Model is based on the traditional, bilateral conception of
federalism.  However, this model still requires the courts to apply
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the Dole-NFIB framework to localities directly because it recog-
nizes that the federal government pressures states to decide
whether to recapitalize specific localities when they offer federal
funds to specific localities.  In so doing, the model preserves states’
authority to govern their territory through politically representative
local governments.  Either model would ensure that the Dole-NFIB
framework preserves federalism by preserving state and local offi-
cials’ agency when they contract with the federal government.
The United States is becoming more and more politically po-
larized, and that polarization is becoming increasingly defined by
geography.  As a result, the United States is a country where many
of its largest cities are islands of blue in a sea of red counties and
states.  This trend has and will continue to intensify federal-local
conflict over policies, particularly in the areas of immigration, law
enforcement, housing, and community development.  Moving for-
ward, Republican presidents and congresses will use the spending
power to push their agenda onto Democratic cities; meanwhile,
Democratic presidents and congresses will use that power against
red states.  Applying the Dole-NFIB framework to localities when
they are empowered to accept federal funds, through either the De-
cision-Maker Model or the Localized Expenditure Model, is essen-
tial to preserve federalism in this era of spatially concentrated
political polarization.
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